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I. INTRODUCTION
The adversarial relationship is fundamental to our system of
* The author extends his thanks to Donald M. Brown, who inspired the title
to this Comment, and Paul A. Newton, whose editing and proofreading efforts
went far beyond the call of duty.
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justice. One of the assurances of this adversarial system is a de-
fendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.' In turn, the right
to effective assistance of counsel relies in large part on an effective
attorney-client relationship. In recent years, however, the relation-
ship has come under increasing strain as prosecutors become more
aggressive towards defense attorneys and their clients. Specifically,
concern is mounting over grand jury subpoenas issued to defense
attorneys representing targets' under investigation.8 Defense attor-
neys claim that prosecutors may subpoena them to discourage zeal-
ous representation or to prevent them from representing certain
clients,4 results which undermine the adversarial system of crimi-
nal justice.5 Because of these alleged abuses, some courts and com-
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (noting that "right to the aid of
counsel is of ... fundamental character").
2. A grand jury target is defined in the United States Attorneys' Manual as
"a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence
linking him/her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the
prosecutor, is a putative defendant." UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-
11.260 (1984).
Regarding grand jury targets, one commentator has noted:
A person in such circumstances needs legal counsel, to present exculpa-
tory evidence to the prosecutors, to advise him on whether to invoke his
fifth amendment privilege, to negotiate for immunity, to argue against
indictment or to plea bargain . . . . In sum, counsel assists the client in
defending against a possible indictment. To interfere with that defense
infringes on important interests.
Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal For Reform, 23
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 95, 110-11 (1985).
3. See Falsgraf, A Dangerous Wedge Between Attorney and Client, 72
A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 8; Frank, Attorney Subpoenas, 72 A.B.A. J., March 1,
1986, at 32; Genego, Risky Business: The Hazards of Being a Criminal Defense
Lawyer, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1986, at 2; Rudolf & Maher, The Attorney Subpoena:
You Are Hereby Commanded to Betray Your Client, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1986, at
14; Peirce & Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution:
Curbing the Practice of Issuing Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for Targets of
Investigations, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 821 (1985); Weiner, supra note 2; and Comment,
The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Federal Grand Jury: Client's Identity
and Fee Arrangements, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 67 (1985).
4. Genego, supra note 3, at 2-3.
5. When coupled with the 1984 amendments to the fee forfeiture provisions
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. §§
1961-68 (1982 & Supp. 1985)) and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (21
U.S.C. 848 (1981 & Supp. 1985)), a prosecutor's control over defense attorneys
becomes even more pronounced. Genego, supra note 3, at 2-3. For a criticism of
the 1984 amendments, see Krieger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client and the
New Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737 (1985). See also Note, Forfeiture of Attor-
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mentators have urged a prior judicial review of grand jury subpoe-
nas before their issuance to defense attorneys representing
targets.6
The practice of issuing subpoenas to defense attorneys who re-
present grand jury targets has been attacked as infringing on both
constitutional protections7 and the attorney-client privilege. 8 In
addition, some courts have used their supervisory powers to pre-
vent abuse of the grand jury process,9 and the Department of Jus-
tice has even promulgated its own internal guidelines to govern
this type of subpoena. These approaches have not proved generally
successful. Recently, grand jury subpoenas to defense attorneys
have come under a new assault in the form of an ethical rule which
requires prior judicial approval before the subpoena may be served
on a defense attorney."0
This Comment will first explore the problems associated with
grand jury subpoenas to defense attorneys, and then move on to
examine the role of the grand jury in the criminal justice system.
The Comment will then survey previous approaches to the prob-
lem and their deficiencies, following which it will focus on the new
ethical rule and its ramifications for the grand jury process. Fi-
nally, it will will suggest alternatives to the current approaches.
II. THE PROBLEM OF GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS TO DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS
The central concern in grand jury subpoenas issued to defense
attorneys involves the chilling effect the subpoena may have on the
attorney-client relationship. In most jurisdictions, judicial approval
neys' Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with
the "Fruits of the Crime'?, 39 STAN. L. REv. 663 (1987).
6. See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, vacated
when target fled, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (1985), vacated, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986); Peirce & Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a
Witness for the Prosecution: Curbing the Practice of Issuing Grand Jury Sub-
poenas to Counsel for Targets of Investigations, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 821 (1985); Ru-
dolf & Maher, The Attorney Subpoena: You Are Hereby Commanded to Betray
Your Client, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1986, at 14; Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Sub-
poenas to Attorneys: A Proposal For Reform, 23 AM. CrM. L. REV. 95 (1985).
7. See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 130-50 and accompanying text.
10. MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08 (Prosecution Function 15) (1985).
19871
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is not required prior to issuing grand jury subpoenas to defense
attorneys." The present practice under the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure is that "[tihe clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed
and sealed but otherwise in blank to a party requesting it, who
shall fill in the blanks before it is served."' 2 Consequently, a dis-
trict attorney may issue subpoenas unfettered by any judicial re-
view whatsoever.' s
Calling a lawyer before a grand jury to testify against his cli-
ent can have numerous ramifications. At worse, the lawyer may
give incriminating information to the prosecutor, converting him
into to the government's star witness at trial."' At best, the attor-
ney must reveal to the client that he will be appearing, testifying,
or producing documents for the grand jury,' which in itself may
have a chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship.
This gives district attorneys a potentially dangerous weapon
11. Currently, only the Third Circuit, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Scho-
field I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, see
supra note 10, and the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, see infra
note 205 and accompanying text, require a prior showing before serving grand
jury subpoenas.
Although federal prosecutors are not alone in their use of grand jury subpoe-
nas, state prosecutors seldom issue subpoenas to attorneys because of the infre-
quent use of grand juries in most state systems. Caplow, The Reluctant Witness
for the Prosecution: Grand Jury Subpoenas to Defense Counsel, 51 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 769, 771 n.9. In addition, trial subpoenas are also rarely issued to defense
attorneys because of the "obvious interference" with the attorney-client relation-
ship and almost certain attorney disqualification. Id. at 773, n.18.
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
13. "'The prosecutor has a block of blank forms in his desk and he decides
who is going to be called and when . . . .'" Riley, New Rule Set on Lawyer Sub-
poenas, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 42. (quoting Edgar J. Bellefontaine, reporter
for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts). The Justice Department does
require compliance with its own internal procedures but these self-imposed re-
straints have done little to quell the criticism of the practice of issuing subpoenas
to attorneys representing grand jury targets. See infra notes 163-71 and accompa-
nying text.
14. It is well-settled that an attorney-witness cannot assert his client's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976). Furthermore, "[i]nformation that incriminates may take any
form; depending upon what other information the authorities already know, the
most trivial detail may be all that is necessary to decide the question of whether
to prosecute. Thus even unprivileged and apparently innocuous information can
help trigger an indictment." Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 3, at 834.
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983), and
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(1) (1980).
350 [Vol. 9:347
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss2/4
GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
with which to disqualify defense counsel, even if that counsel has
already consulted extensively with the client about the subject of
the grand jury investigation. Disqualification may occur if there is
the possibility that the attorney subpoenaed will be called to tes-
tify about information potentially prejudicial to his clients.1 6 One
court has noted:
[T]he unbridled use of the subpoena potentially allows the Gov-
ernment, in this and future cases, to decide unilaterally that an
attorney will not represent his client. Such a power of disqualifi-
cation can undermine and debilitate our legal system by subject-
ing the criminal defense bar to the subservience of a governmen-
tal agent.17
This disqualification power may allow a prosecutor to rid himself
of an aggressive defense attorney who may then be replaced by a
less vigorous or less experienced opponent.'"
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the law-
yer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal ser-
vices rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hard-
ship on the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1980) provides:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation,
a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be
called as a witness other than on behalf of his client he may continue the
representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be preju-
dicial to his client.
See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.
1985), vacated, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515
(1986) ("[B]y calling an attorney as a witness against his client, the Government
is surely setting the stage for the attorney's ultimate disqualification." Id. at 973).
17. Doe, 759 F.2d at 975. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis),
412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976) where the court stated:
[W]e are disturbed by the practice of calling a lawyer before a grand jury
which is investigating his client, especially where the government does
not have good grounds for belief that the lawyer possesses unprivileged,
relevant evidence that cannot be obtained elsewhere.... The practice
permits the government by unilateral action to create the possibility of a
conflict of interest between attorney and client, which may lead to the
suspect's being denied his choice of counsel by disqualification.
Id. at 945-46.
18. "Where counsel is inexperienced, inept or compliant, the prosecutor
would have little incentive to 'conflict' him or her out of the case by issuing a
1987]
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Even if the subpoena does not require withdrawal of counsel,
the effect on the attorney-client relationship can be just as chilling.
Consider the following scenario. The attorney holds information
which is incriminating, embarrassing, or harmful to his client. The
lawyer has acquired this information on the basis of the confiden-
tial relationship between himself and the client. The prosecutor
serves a grand jury subpoena on the defense attorney, requesting
him to testify or produce records for the proceeding. The grand
jury proceedings, being secret,1 fuel the client's suspicions about
his attorney's motives for appearing before it. 2 0 Has his attorney
struck a deal with the prosecutor without his knowledge? The at-
torney may make a motion to quash the subpoena 21 on a belief
that it infringes on the attorney-client privilege, but if the motion
is denied he faces a possible contempt sanction if he does not com-
ply with the subpoena. Furthermore, the attorney is required to
actually enter the grand jury room to assert the attorney-client
privilege, at which time he may do so only on an item-by-item ba-
sis. 22 The mere presence of the client's attorney in the grand jury
room, even to assert valid privileges, can foster "doubts in the cli-
ent's mind as to his lawyer's unfettered devotion to the client's in-
terests ... "23 In many jurisdictions, if the attorney is ordered to
testify, the only way to appeal the order is to disobey it, be held in
contempt and then appeal the contempt judgment.2 4 "The client
subpoena. Where counsel is particularly aggressive and effective, however, the in-
centive would be great." Rudolf & Maher, supra note 3, at 16. See also Frank,
supra note 3, at 32-33 and infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). See infra note 118.
20. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 96. The "erosion of trust is particularly de-
structive when the attorney has been responsible for the client's legal matters for
many years." Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 3, at 857.
21. Such a motion would come under Rule 17(c) which allows the quashing of
a subpoena if compliance would be "unreasonable or oppressive." FED. R. CRiM. P.
17(c). See infra note 194.
22. In the Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 630 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1038 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); United
States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
23. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
24. See In re Oberkoeter, 612 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Vargas), 723 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983); and In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d
1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Other circuits follow the rule in Perlman v. United States,
247 U.S. 7 (1918) which holds that when a subpoena is issued to a third party,
such as an attorney, the party who claims that the production of the subpoenaed
documents would violate his right against self-incrimination may make an imme-
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may believe that the trust he vested in his attorney was misplaced.
The lesson of such an experience for the client is to keep poten-
tially incriminating information out of his attorney's knowledge."2
But without such knowledge, an attorney may not be able to
mount an effective defense for his client.
The client is not alone in his bewildered state, for the subpoe-
naed attorney finds that he faces equally pressing problems. The
defense attorney finds himself in the throes of an ethical/legal tug
of war because when he receives the grand jury subpoena, he must
comply with the subpoena or likely be found in contempt.2 6 On the
other hand, an attorney, under the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvan-
tage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage
of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents
after full disclosure.
2 7
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(2) provides some relief to the at-
diate appeal, since the attorney cannot be expected to risk a contempt sanction.
Even in circuits which permit an appeal from an order compelling the attorney to
testify without requiring a contempt judgment against him, the district court may
still choose to impose the contempt sanction if it desires. See In re Grand Jury
Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982) (attorneys immediately held in con-
tempt for refusal to obey subpoenas ordering production of records relating to
clients' fee information and identities); and In re Grand Jury Investigation No.
83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983) (district court found attorney in contempt
for failing to disclose the name of his client).
25. Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 3, at 833. See also In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
26. "Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena
served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the sub-
poena issued or of the court for the district in which it issued if it was issued by a
United States magistrate." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g).
27. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1982). Under
DR 4-101(A) "confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege and "secret" refers to information outside the privilege that "the client
has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing
or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." The Model Rules expand
secrets to include all "information relating to representation of a client" regard-
less of whether it is privileged, regardless of whether the client asked for it to be
kept in confidence, and regardless of whether revealing it might harm or embar-
rass the client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(2) comment
(1983).
1987] 353
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torney by allowing the attorney to reveal a "secret" or "confi-
dence" if required by law or court order. The problem for the at-
torney then becomes deciding the point at which the law requires
the "secret" or "confidence" to be revealed.
Is it enough for the attorney personally to make this decision or
must he first litigate the arguments against disclosure? If litiga-
tion is required, which of the various arguments against disclos-
ure need be made and how far must the litigation be pursued?
After the lower court has ordered disclosure, must the lawyer go
into contempt to obtain an appeal prior to disclosure of arguably
privileged information? Further, if the client wants to preserve
secrecy to the maximum extent possible, but is unable to afford
the cost of such litigation, does the Disciplinary Rule require the
attorney to commit his own resources to litigate such issues?28
In the absence of a court order or requirement of law, the
Model Code 9 and Model Rules30 forbid voluntary disclosure with-
out client consent and would probably not permit it when a prose-
cutor requested information from the defense attorney that might
be used in criminal proceedings against his client. 1 An attorney
may voluntarily disclose information only with the client's full
knowledge and consent. The attorney may also have a conflict of
interest in advising the client about whether to give this consent,
since he would avoid a contempt citation by having the client do
so. As the First Circuit stated in In re Grand Jury Matters:32
"[T]he lawyers' interest lies in avoiding potential contempt sanc-
tions by complying with the subpoenas ... By contrast, the cli-
ent's interest in lessening the likelihood of the indictment . . .
would require the lawyer to do his utmost, including incurring con-
tempt citations to resist the subpoena."33
28. Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 3, at 836.
29. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 4-101(C) (1980).
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILIry Rule 1.6 (1983).
31. Rudolf & Maher, supra note 3, at 19.
32. 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 19. See also In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d
1005, vacated when target fled, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc). Such a
conflict could also deprive the client of his sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text. A more omi-
nous conflict of interest may occur if, as was recently revealed, prosecutors make
plea bargain offers that effect the defense attorney's own fee. For instance, the
prosecution might offer to not seek fee forfeiture if a client pled guilty. If the
client went to trial, however, the prosecution might seek fee forfeiture under the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statutes or RICO. Genego, supra note 3, at 7.
354 [Vol. 9:347
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The net effect of the grand jury subpoena to a defense attor-
ney representing a target is that it chills the attorney-client rela-
tionship. That the government has simply issued a subpoena on
the target's attorney may be enough to chill the relationship; 34
however, the chilling result caused by a grand jury subpoena to a
target's attorney does not end with an extant attorney-client rela-
tionshipS3 -the very fact that an attorney must reveal something
as simple as the existence of an attorney-client relationship before
a grand jury may disuade some persons from even seeking legal
advice.3"
Data collected by Professor William J. Genego of the Univer-
sity of Southern California Law Center further demonstrates the
extent of the problem.3 7 Professor Genego surveyed members of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys in May
and June of 1985. The results revealed that since 1980 the use of
certain prosecutorial practices aimed at defense attorneys has dra-
matically increased.38 Fourteen percent of the respondents re-
ported they had decided not to accept a specific criminal case or
cases due to these prosecutorial procedures.3 9 Forty-six percent re-
ported that they had made changes in their criminal defense prac-
tice because of increased use of various prosecutorial methods.41
The attorneys were also less open in advising their clients, fearing
that the advice might be used by the government if the client later
decided to cooperate with the prosecutor.4 1 Finally, the lawyers
34. Rudolf & Maher, supra note 3, at 16.
35. See In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (responding
to a motion to compel an attorney to testify before the grand jury, court noted "it
bears emphasis that while the witness before us is a lawyer, the crucial interests
at stake belong to the whole community").
36. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Shargel), 742 F.2d 61, 63
(2d Cir. 1984) ("We would be less than candid not to concede that the lack of
privilege against disclosure of the fact of an attorney-client relationship may dis-
courage some persons from seeking legal advice at all.").
37. Genego, supra note 3, at 2.
38. Professor Genego's research indicates that grand jury subpoenas to de-
fense lawyers increased from four percent in 1974 or before to sixty-eight percent
in the years 1983-85. Id. at 4.
39. Genego, supra note 3, at 40.
40. Id. at 5. The "data indicate[s] that defense lawyers are leery of taking
notorious clients or don't use their strongest defense for fear of being subpoenaed
or putting their clients-and themselves-at risk." Frank, Attorney Subpoenas,
72 A.B.A. J., March 1, 1986, at 32.
41. "Some defense lawyers say they are harassed with disqualification mo-
tions, confidential informants at meetings, and attempts to 'entrap' them through
1987] 355
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most likely to be served with grand jury subpoenas were those who
had been in practice ten years or more, had won many cases, and
earned the most legal fees. Professor Genego states:
As government prosecutors face numbers of well-to-do de-
fendants represented by aggressive and skilled attorneys, prosecu-
tors may well be responding by employing tactics to disarm the
adversary. An obvious target is the defendant's most powerful
weapon-the attorney in charge of the defense.
The question of whether the government intentionally has
adopted a policy of using the practices identified to discourage
zealous advocacy by criminal defense attorneys is, however, be-
side the point. What is important is that the practices are in fact
used, their use is widespread, and they have already had an effect
on the professional behavior of criminal defense attorneys.4
2
The practice of issuing subpoenas without prior judicial ap-
proval can seriously undermine the adversarial nature of criminal
proceedings. When a prosecutor is able to discourage or disqualify
defense attorneys through the use of a subpoena issued with no
prior review, he has gained a tremendous advantage that may
prove difficult to overcome.
III. THE ROLE OF THE GRAND JURY
The origin of the grand jury dates from at least 1166," and the
fifth amendment mandates its very existence." The grand jury
serves a dual function. It must first be able to inquire into crimes
and, if warranted by the evidence, issue indictments. 5 The second
and equally important function is to protect the accused from un-
founded accusations. This dual function has been likened to the
"'shield and the sword' of the criminal justice process""' and com-
bogus 'clients' who are government agents ... " Frank, supra note 3, at 32.
42. Genego, supra note 3, at 40-41.
43. W. LAF^vE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.2, at 347 (1984).
44. The pertinent section of the fifth amendment provides that no person
"shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
45. 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 189, at 414 (12th ed.
1974).
46. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 43, § 8.1, at 346. "Its responsibilities
... include both the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a
[Vol. 9:347
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missions the grand jury as a unique entity, clothed with considera-
ble independence 4 7 -a captive of neither the executive nor judicial
branches.8
The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has emphasized
the importance of the grand jury's power to compel evidence from
witnesses, as well as a citizen's duty to testify when called.4 9 In
Branzburg v. Hayes,50 a reporter sought protection under the first
amendment to avoid testifying about his sources before a grand
jury. The Court declined to establish such a privilege, stating: "Al-
though the powers of the grand jury are subject to the supervision
of a judge, the longstanding principle that 'the public . . . has a
right to every man's evidence,' except for those persons protected
by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege,. is par-
ticularly applicable to grand jury proceedings." '51
This breadth of power is indispensable, for the grand jury
must be able to investigate alleged wrongdoing on mere suspicion,
follow up on tips and rumors, and examine witnesses.52 These in-
vestigations must be free from technical rules that could be used to
delay and lengthen the proceedings. 3 In this vein, the Supreme
Court has held that hearsay is admissible in the grand jury room,"
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceed-
ings,55 and has further indicated that a grand jury target is not
entitled to the assistance of counsel.56
crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded crimi-
nal prosecutions." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (citing
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972)).
47. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959).
48. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977).
49. "The grand jury is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation
and inquisition the scope of whose powers of investigation and inquiries is not to
be limited narrowly. . . ." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
50. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
51. Id. at 688 (citations omitted). "Indeed, no aspect of grand jury power is
more frequently extolled by the courts, particularly in cases rejecting challenges
to subpoenas, than its right to compel the testimony of any person, subject only
to 'constitutional, common law or statutory privilege.'" W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 43, § 8.6, at 369.
52. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962); United States v. Stone, 429
F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970).
53. W. LAFAV & J. ISRAEL, supra note 43, § 8.6, at 370.
54. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1953).
55. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
56. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (dictum).
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Although theoretically the grand jury is not a captive of either
the executive or judicial branches, critics have assailed grand jury
subpoenas as largely instrumentalities of the prosecutor.5 7 A prose-
cutor may issue grand jury subpoenas without any judicial check.
In response to this unchecked power of the prosecutor, there has
been a move towards requiring judicial review before issuing sub-
poenas to defense attorneys who represent grand jury targets. The
requirement of prior judicial review to protect the attorney-client
interests at stake has found its source in several different theories.
Specifically, prior judicial review for grand jury subpoenas to de-
fense attorneys has been suggested under a constitutional ap-
proach, an attorney-client privilege approach and a supervisory
powers of the court approach. As noted earlier, concern about at-
torney subpoenas has even prompted the Justice Department to
issue its own internal reviewing guidelines governing the issuance
of these instruments. Because all approaches have proved largely
unsatisfactory, judicial review of attorney subpoenas has most re-
cently become the focus of an ethical rule.5 8 After an overview of
previous attempts to regulate the practice of issuing subpoenas to
attorneys representing grand jury targets, this Comment will focus
on the new ethical rule.
IV. ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM
A. The Constitutional Approach
The constitutional interests at stake in a subpoena issued to
an attorney representing a grand jury target arise from the fifth
and sixth amendments. The Supreme Court has recognized a con-
stitutional right to counsel at certain pretrial stages under both of
these amendments.59 Under the sixth amendment the right to
counsel exists wherever necessary to assure a meaningful defense. 0
Under the sixth as well as the fifth amendment, an accused has the
right to effective assistance of counsel. 1
57. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield 1), 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir.
1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (noting further that "it is
... common knowledge that the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark
between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive").
58. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08 (Prosecution Function 15) (1985).
59. Note, The Presence of Counsel in the Grand Jury Room, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1138, 1142 (1979).
60. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967).
61. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-68 (1932).
[Vol. 9:347
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1. Sixth Amendment Concerns
The Supreme Court has stated that sixth amendment rights
do not attach until the commencement of judicial proceedings
against a defendant.02 Grand jury hearings are not among those
proceedings where a target has the right to counsel since they are
investigatory in nature;63 however, the Supreme Court has recently
reiterated:
[T]he assistance of counsel cannot be limited to participation in a
trial; to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to
trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the
trial itself.
The Sixth Amendment also imposes on the State an affirmative
obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek
this assistance. We have . ..made clear that, at the very least,
the prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not to act
in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection
afforded by the right to counsel."'
62. "[T]he right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after
the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him-'whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraign-
ment.'" Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)). But see United States v. Gouveia,
104 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) where Justice Stevens found
that this statement "does not foreclose the possibility that the right to counsel
might under some circumstances attach prior to the formal initiation of judicial
proceedings. . . ." In United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), a plural-
ity of the court refused to hold that a person has the right to counsel in the grand
jury room. Lower courts have held from this decision that the sixth amendment
does not attach at any point in grand jury representation by an attorney. See, e.g.,
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986).
Some commentators have criticized the inconsistency of giving an accused the
right to counsel in police interrogations and preliminary hearings but denying
that same right to a witness before a grand jury hearing. See Dash, The Indicting
Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 AM. CraM. L. REv. 807 (1972); and Meshbesher,
Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1966).
63. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-44 (1974); Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 280-82 (1919).
64. Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484-85 (1985). See also Flanagan v.
United States, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465
U.S. 259 (1984); Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978).
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In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 5 the Sec-
ond Circuit initially found sixth amendment rights sufficiently
pressing to require a preliminary showing of need and relevance by
the government before issuing a subpoena to the target's attorney.
The subpoena duces tecum requested fee records and records of
property transfers between the attorney and his client6" to enable
the government to determine if the target had arranged to pay the
attorneys' fees for members of his organization. The court quashed
the subpoena, finding that the defendant sought to preserve his
right to counsel in the event he was indicted. The court found this
right would be rendered meaningless if it did not attach during the
grand jury stage since the client's choice of counsel might be de-
nied if his attorney turned over the records, testified, and was then
subsequently disqualified.17 The Second Circuit sitting en banc va-
cated the judgment, 8 finding that the target's concern raised po-
tential sixth amendment rights and that there was no guarantee
that counsel would have to withdraw, since there was no certainty
defense counsel would even be called and disqualified under DR 5-
102(B).69
65. 759 F.2d 968, vacated, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1515 (1986).
66. The subpoenas requested:
[A]ny and all records of fees, monies, property or other things of value
received, accepted, transferred or held by [the attorney] or by any associ-
ate of [the attorney] on his behalf, from on account of, or on behalf of
[the target]. These records are to include, but not be limited to, records
of fees, monies, property or other things of value received, accepted
transferred to or held by the [attorney] or by any associate of the [attor-
ney] on his behalf in connection with [the criminal proceedings].
Doe, 781 F.2d at 242.
67. Doe, 759 F.2d at 972-73. ("[B]y calling an attorney as witness against his
client, the Government is surely setting the stage for the attorney's ultimate dis-
qualification." Id. at 973.) See also Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.
1984) where the Third Circuit found a violation of the effective assistance of
counsel where a defense attorney stipulated to facts that were harmful to the de-
fendant's case, yet remained as counsel. "The framers of the [sixth] amendment
did not propose it to assure an individual counsel a right to testify against his own
client and still participate in the case." Id. at 138. But cf. Davis v. Stamler, 650
F.2d 477, 479 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Although the sixth amendment guarantees criminal
defendants an absolute right to the assistance of counsel, it does not guarantee
them an absolute right to counsel of their choice.").
68. 781 F.2d 238.
69. Id. at 244-45. "The appropriate time to balance the interests of the gov-
ernment and [the target's] right to counsel is at the pretrial stage, not at the
grand jury stage." Id. at 243.
[Vol. 9:347360
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Any holding that would extend the sixth amendment right to
counsel to grand jury proceedings and give attorneys an active role
in the proceedings would radically alter the grand jury process.70
As prosecutors become more aggressive, however, the investigatory
character of the grand jury changes and it becomes more adver-
sarial in nature. If a prosecutor can unilaterally control the choice
of counsel in an arbitrary fashion, then according to the Supreme
Court's words in Moulton, sixth amendment rights would be impli-
cated . 1 As noted by Justice Brennan in United States v.
Mandujano,'2 the Supreme Court has never squarely faced the is-
sue of whether a grand jury target has a right to counsel. 3 Justice
Brennan has also found that a "putative defendant" summoned to
testify faces the same prosecutorial forces and needs an attorney
just as badly as a defendant after indictment. 4
2. Fifth Amendment Concerns
The fifth amendment due process concerns of issuing grand
jury subpoenas to attorneys who represent targets have also cen-
tered on the accused's right to the effective assistance of counsel.' 5
Some courts have indicated that the fifth amendment right is es-
sentially the same as the sixth amendment right,'7 but one jurist
has pointed out that the fifth amendment may come into play at
an earlier stage than the sixth amendment.7" Therefore, if a grand
jury target is
arbitrarily deprived of the right to counsel of his own choice, such
that he will be unfairly deprived of the right to the effective assis-
70. See Note, supra note 59, at 1147.
71. See supra text at note 64.
72. 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
73. Id. at 603 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court did state in dictum in In
re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) that a witness "before a grand jury cannot insist
as a matter of constitutional right on being represented by his counsel." Id. at
333.
74. Id. at 604-06 (Brennan, J., concurring). Note that the United States At-
torney's Manual defines a "target" as a "putative defendant." UNITED STATES AT-
TORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.260 (1984). See supra note 2.
75. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
76. United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1982); Davis v.
Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 1981).
77. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (Cardomone,
J., dissenting). Due process rights "obey no timetable, they neither attach nor
cease to apply at any particular moment." Id. at 258.
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tance of counsel at the trial itself, the due process clause has been
violated, regardless of whether or not an indictment has been re-
turned against the target. 8
This argument was also advanced in Doe. To prevent an arbitrary
loss of counsel, the argument continues, the government should
make a preliminary showing that the government's need for the
information outweighs the loss of counsel.7' In this scenario, the
fifth amendment would affect the outcome only where the sixth
amendment has not yet attached. When the government arbitrarily
issues a subpoena to disqualify counsel pursuant to DR 5-102(B),
due process will likely have been violated.80
Supreme Court decisions discussing the due process right to
counsel, however, have dealt with the actual parties in the litiga-
78. Id. See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) where the Supreme
Court found that the right to counsel means a "defendant should be afforded a
fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Id. at 53. Furthermore, due
process includes the "right to aid of counsel when desired and provided by the
party asserting the right." Id. at 68. In Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), the
Court found that the right of a defendant to be heard through his own counsel is
unqualified and that a defendant "must be given a reasonable opportunity to em-
ploy and consult with counsel . . . ." Id. at 10.
79. Id. Where an attorney has represented a particular client for a number of
years, a deprivation of counsel could be regarded as a property interest which
could not be denied without due process and the balancing test of Matthews v.
Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319 (1976) (balance private interest, risk of erroneous depriva-
tion and probable value of additional safeguards against the government's interest
and the burdens the additional safeguards entail). The Second Circuit indicated a
similar line of reasoning in In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977) where the
court stated: "To impose counsel upon a witness against his will or arbitrarily to
forbid him from retaining a particular attorney unnecessarily obstructs his ability
to enter private contractual arrangements for representation and would deprive
him of his constitutional right to due process of law." Id. at 1186 n.1.
80. See Doe, 781 F.2d at 261 (Cardomone, J., dissenting). The Seventh Cir-
cuit stated in In the Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985):
An effort by the Government to strip a suspect of a lawyer with
unique knowledge or abilities would present constitutional difficulties;
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment might prohibit an effort
by the Government to impose on the defendant the expense of paying
multiple lawyers to prepare for trial in order to have a single defense.
Id. at 633. See also United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1982)
("[a] defendant's choice of counsel is not to be dealt with lightly or arbitrarily"),
rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259 (1984). However, the majority in Doe dis-
agreed that the fifth amendment attaches earlier than the sixth amendment and
further found that the fifth amendment neither expanded or contracted existing
sixth amendment rights. 781 F.2d at 246.
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tion. s1 Mere witnesses are not entitled to fair hearing require-
ments.8" Yet the grand jury target and his attorney must be con-
sidered more than a mere witness; the target himself is, by
definition, a "putative defendant."83 Nevertheless, the target is not
yet a party to the litigation, and under current Supreme Court de-
cisions is not entitled to the rights attendant to a party.8"
Whichever constitutional right might be implicated by a grand
jury subpoena to a defense attorney, providing a blanket right to
counsel at the grand jury stage would significantly impair the
grand jury's investigatory function. Under current law the target is
not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, make objections, or ques-
tion witnesses favorable to his position. Any expansion of the sixth
amendment to cover grand jury proceedings should only apply in
the narrowest of circumstances; but where an ongoing attorney-cli-
ent relationship exists and the client is a target of the grand jury,
arguably the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
might be expanded to include the target, especially where later
trial rights might be adversely affected. 5
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege
Another approach for remedying the problem of grand jury
subpoenas to attorneys representing targets has come through the
attorney-client privilege. The privilege ensures that information
passed in the relationship will remain confidential to "encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote a broader public interest in the observance of
law and the administration of justice."88 The privilege protects
communications made in confidence which concern legal advice
from client to attorney.87 Confidentiality is essential for the attor-
81. Note, A Critical Appraisal of the Justice Department Guidelines for
Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Defense Attorneys, 1986 DUKE L.J. 145, 164.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 2.
84. One advantage a due process theory would have over the sixth amend-
ment is that due process is more flexible and could be applied on a case-by-case
basis. It would allow courts to weigh the unique qualities of the grand jury and
would not necessarily encompass an absolute right to appointed counsel for the
grand jury target. See S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE §
6:17, at 95 (1986).
85. See Note, supra note 81, at 165.
86. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
87. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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ney to properly perform his role; however, it is not only confidenti-
ality but prior assurance of confidentiality to the client that is nec-
essary for an effective attorney-client relationship.
The privilege does not protect all communications and it is
construed strictly.88 In order for the privilege to attach, either the
attorney or the client must demonstrate that:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of stranger (c)
for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law
or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding,
and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4)
the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.8
The privilege does not cover certain areas that are considered non-
confidential or noncommunicative in nature.90 For instance, the
identity of the client,' the fee arrangement,9 the location of the
client,'3 and nonlegal advice94 are all outside the scope of the
88. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
89. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950). For another formulation see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 87, § 2292, at
554.
90. The privilege does not apply where communications are made for the in-
tent of committing a crime. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d
1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1982). The privilege may also be waived where a voluntary
disclosure is made by the client to a third party about communications made to
the attorney. The waiver applies not only to the specific communication but may
also apply to all communications on the subject. See Weil v. Investment Indica-
tors, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 809 (3d Cir. 1984); In
re Grand Jury Investigation No. 82-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983).
92. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 247
(2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct 1515 (1986); In re Shargel, 742
F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Witness Before Special March 1980 Grand Jury,
729 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir.
1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir.
1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Twist), 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir.
1982); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Walsh v. United
States, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
93.- See, e.g., In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Walsh v.
United States, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
94. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
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privilege.
Even these nonprivileged areas, however, are subject to excep-
tions. In the area of client identity and fee arrangements, the
breadth of the exception depends on whether the court subscribes
to a "legal advice," "last link," or communication rationale.9 5
Under the "legal advice" theory, the communication is privileged
when a strong possibility exists that disclosure would implicate the
client in the very matter for which he sought legal advice in the
first place.9 The "last link" exception provides that the fee infor-
mation or identity of the client is privileged if the information
would provide the "last link" in a chain of incriminating evidence
likely to result in the client's indictment.9 7 The communication ra-
tionale classifies information about fees or client identity as privi-
leged, if disclosure would connect the client to an already privi-
leged exchange.98
95. The exceptions grew out of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Baird v. Koer-
ner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) where an attorney mailed payment of a tax-
payer's back taxes which the taxpayer had underpaid. The IRS subpoenaed the
attorney and demanded to know the taxpayer's identity and the attorney claimed
the attorney-client privilege. The court created an exception for the client's iden-
tity since the disclosure was for the sole purpose of demonstrating an acknowl-
edgement of guilt. Id. at 632-33. For an extensive analysis of the exceptions, see
Note, Benefactor Payments Before the Grand Jury: The Legal Advice and In-
crimination Theories of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 537
(1985). See also Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1514-24 (1985); Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege and
the Federal Grand Jury: Client's Identity and Fee Arrangements, 13 AM. J.
CRiM. L. 67 (1985).
96. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1013 (4th Cir.), va-
cated when target fled, 697 F.2d 112 (1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hodge & Zweig,
548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
97. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc).
98. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum (Shargel), 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d
Cir. 1984) (stating that the information protected where it would "amount to the
prejudicial disclosure of a confidential communication"). Of the three theories,
the confidential communications exception is the most commonly accepted. See
Comment, supra note 95, at 75. All three rationales have been criticized: The
"last link" and communication exception because they do not consider the client's
intent about the exchange, and the "legal advice" exception because it may pro-
tect a client's effort to violate the law. See Developments, supra note 95, at 1523-
24.
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In In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey),9 9 the Fourth
Circuit found that under the legal advice exception, the govern-
ment should make a preliminary showing of relevance and need
before subpoenaing an attorney for a grand jury target. 100 This
showing would allow the court to determine the nature of the doc-
uments sought and thereby determine whether disclosure" 'would
implicate that client in the very criminal act for which legal advice
was sought.' "101 Requiring a preliminary showing by the govern-
ment is a significant departure from the standard method of invok-
ing the attorney-client privilege, since the burden of establishing
the existence of the privilege lies with the party asserting it,'02 and
therefore, in the case of subpoenaed attorneys, requires them to
enter the grand jury room in order to do so.' 0 ' The decision in
Harvey was vacated when the target became a fugitive,'0 4 and sub-
sequent decisions have steered away from requiring a preliminary
showing under the attorney-client privilege.10 5
Client identity and fee arrangements are important in the in-
vestigation of certain crimes. For example, the amount of fees paid
by the client to the attorney may establish proof of "substantial
income" in a continuing criminal enterprise, 06 or establish that the
client's expenditures exceed his reported income in a criminal tax
investigation. Identity information may be used to show a conspir-
acy where an anonymous client or donor pays the attorney's fee for
another person.107
Yet clients with legitimate pursuits benefit from the protec-
tion of identity or fee arrangement information as well. United
States v. Liebman""8 involved a group of attorneys who specialized
in tax law and evaluated real estate partnerships for clients who
99. 676 F.2d 1005, 1013 (4th Cir.), vacated when subject fled, 697 F.2d 112
(1982).
100. Id. at 1011.
101. Id. at 1009 (quoting United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347,
1353 (9th Cir. 1977)).
102. See In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 454 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, Durant v. United States, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984).
103. See supra note 22.
104. 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982).
105. See In the Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Schofield,
721 F.2d 1221, 1222 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 594-95
(9th Cir. 1983); In re Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983).
106. Developments, supra note 95, at 1522.
107. Id.
108. 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984).
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wanted investments for tax purposes. The attorneys charged fees
for the service only if clients actually invested. When the Internal
Revenue Service discovered that some investors were deducting
the fees paid to the attorneys, it sought by summons to obtain the
names of others who might have done the same. The Third Circuit
reversed the lower court 0 9 and held the information was protected
under the communication rationale exception. "
The current scope of the attorney-client privilege does not
solve the problem of attorney subpoenas. It cannot be asserted un-
til after an appearance before the grand jury.1 It is also easily
waived and may be unwittingly done so by the client.11 2 Since the
privilege belongs to the client, the grand jury can compel an attor-
ney to testify about confidential information in the event of a cli-
ent's waiver. " The current privilege makes it difficult for the at-
torney to determine what information might incriminate his client,
because whether the information is incriminatory turns on what
information the prosecutor and grand jury already hold. Further,
what exactly is included in the privilege varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.1 1 4 Since the attorney must assert the privilege before
109. 569 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1983).
110. 742 F.2d at 810. The work product doctrine has also been used at the
grand jury level even though it is structured more specifically towards trial prepa-
ration. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Duffy), 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); but see United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967);
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956). The doctrine prevents discovery of material prepared in anticipation of
litigation and is codified in one form in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The opposing party can obtain the information requested if it can
demonstrate substantial need and an inability to obtain the information from
other sources. The courts, however, differ greatly on the definition of "in anticipa-
tion of litigation." Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 3, at 844-45.
111. Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 3, at 848; see also cases cited at supra
note 22. Many courts have allowed an in camera inspection of the information
where a dispute arises as to whether the information is privileged. The party as-
serting the privilege is then given the opportunity to explain how the subpoenaed
material fits within the privilege. The court may then issue a protective order over
the privileged portions before turning the materials over to the grand jury. See In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982).
112. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Horowitz), 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
113. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
114. Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 3, at 849.
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the grand jury, the client still remains uncertain about his attor-
ney's loyalty." 5 Expanding the privilege to cover fee arrangements
and identity information, however, would incur the danger of an
absolute bar to the information, effectively denying the govern-
ment potentially valuable evidence no matter how great its need. " 6
C. The Supervisory Powers Approach
As another approach to the subpoena problem, a few courts
have exercised their supervisory powers over the grand jury by re-
quiring that prosecutors obtain judicial approval before issuing
subpoenas to defense attorneys representing grand jury targets.
This approach comes about, in part, because although courts rec-
ognize that a party seeking to demonstrate an abuse of the sub-
poena process may use discovery, " ' Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 6(e) " 8 mandates absolute secrecy in matters before the
grand jury, making it difficult for the defense attorney to deter-
mine what information prosecutors hold against his client. In addi-
tion, the approach recognizes the various interests at stake in at-
torney subpoenas and does not require an overly expansive reading
of either constitutional or attorney-client privilege protections
since it is an outgrowth of both. The Supreme Court first formu-
lated its supervisory power over the administration of criminal jus-
tice in McNabb v. United States.11 9 There, the Court reversed the
defendants' murder convictions because arresting officers failed to
follow proper detention and interrogation procedures. Authorities
115. Id. at 862.
116. Note, supra note 81, at 161-62. Expanding the privilege to allow it to
incorporate the client's right against self-incrimination has been criticized as al-
lowing a third party benefactor who pays for the legal services of a client to hide
his identity even though the benefactor does not seek legal advice. Id. But see
Note, supra note 95, at 561 ("benefactor, who makes himself criminally vulnera-
ble by payment of his co-conspirator's legal fees, should be able to claim the privi-
lege"). Another factor militating against the use of the privilege is that courts
have not been receptive to using a balancing test on a case-by-case basis when the
attorney-client privilege is found to apply. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REv.
464, 468-69 (1977).
117. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir.
1973).
118. "Records, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand jury proceedings shall
be kept under seal to the extent and for such time as is necessary to prevent
disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(6).
119. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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obtained confessions from several unsophisticated and poorly edu-
cated young men when the men made incriminatory statements af-
ter two days of intensive questioning. In reaching its decision, the
Court stated, "Judicial supervision of the administration of crimi-
nal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing
and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.' '12
The Court ruled that the confessions should have been excluded at
trial and admission of the evidence would make "the courts them-
selves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." 2 ' Although Mc-
Nabb did not indicate whether similar authority existed in the
lower federal courts, subsequent decisions have held that the dis-
trict courts do indeed possess supervisory powers over criminal
proceedings. 22 This supervisory power has been used to curtail im-
proper practices by federal attorneys in several instances.123
In the context of the grand jury, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(a)12 4 and 18 U.S.C. section 3331125 give district courts
the power to call grand juries into being. Rule 17126 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and 28 U.S.C. section 1826127 give the
120. Id. at 340.
121. Id at 345. The decision was, of course, some years before the exclusion-
ary rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was created by the Court.
122. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) ("[I]n the exercise of su-
pervisory powers, federal courts may. . . formulate procedural rules not specifi-
cally required by the Constitution or the Congress." Id. at 505). See also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 970 (3d Cir. 1975) (Aldisert,
J., dissenting) ("Deciding a case in the exercise of a court's supervisory power
means little more than ruling on a basis not specifically set forth in the Constitu-
tion, or by statute, procedural rule, or precedent.").
123. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979) (abusive lan-
guage and improper remarks); United States v. Doss, 545 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1976)
(using grand jury to gather evidence for another trial); Ingram v. United States,
541 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977) (using grand jury to
prepare a civil case). For a discussion of courts' supervisory powers to dismiss a
grand jury indictment in the face of prosecutorial misconduct, see Note, The Ex-
ercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment-A Basis for
Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 (1984).
124. The court shall order one or more grand juries to be summoned at
such times as the public interest requires. The grand jury shall consist of
not less than 16 nor more than 23 members. The court shall direct that a
sufficient number of legally qualified persons be summoned to meet this
requirement.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1982).
126. See supra text accompanying note 12.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1982).
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district courts the power and the duty to enforce subpoenas." 8 One
court has stated that this "supervisory duty not only exists, but is
imposed upon the court, to see that its grand jury and its process
are not abused, or used for purposes of oppression and
injustice."""
The first case to require prosecutors to obtain prior judicial
approval before issuing subpoenas was In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Schofield I).130 In Schofield I, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals exercised its supervisory powers and imposed a broad re-
quirement that the government make a preliminary showing of
relevance and proper purpose for each item requested before a
grand jury subpoena would issue. The prosecutor in the case issued
a subpoena to the defendant requesting her to appear before the
grand jury and testify. When she arrived at the designated time
and place, instead of testifying, she was requested to furnish hand-
writing exemplars and allow the taking of her fingerprints and
photograph. The district court issued an order compelling her to
comply with the request without making any findings. When she
refused, the district court held her in contempt. On appeal, as she
had done below, the defendant argued that the government should
state the purpose and need of the requested subpoena information
before she should have to comply. The Third Circuit agreed and
established three requirements the government had to meet in sat-
isfying a preliminary showing for a subpoena. The government
must demonstrate that: (1) the item was relevant to the grand jury
128. See Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power In Criminal Cases: Consti-
tutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1433, 1493 (1984).
129. In re National Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219, 225 (N.D. Ohio
1922). See also In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 1980) (district courts
are primarily responsible for preventing grand jury abuse); Robert Hawthorne,
Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (supervi-
sory powers necessarily extend beyond constitutional and statutory limits and ex-
tend to granting relief from any type of grand jury abuse). Courts may even in-
voke their supervisory powers without stating that the power is the basis for their
decision. For example, in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), the Court
reviewed a case where the prosecutor made comments about the defendant's fail-
ure to rebut the prosecution's evidence. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the convictions but failed to state its basis for ignoring the harm-
less error doctrine. The Supreme Court on review stated that, "[W]e proceed on
the assumption that, without so stating, the court was exercising its supervisory
powers to discipline the prosecutors of its jurisdiction." Id. at 505.
130. 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
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investigation, (2) the request was within the grand jury's jurisdic-
tion, and (3) the items were not sought primarily for another
purpose.13'
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit distinguished
United States v. Dionisio'32 and United States v. Mara,3" which
had held that the fourth amendment did not require any prelimi-
nary showing for the issuance of a grand jury subpoena to compel
production of voice or handwriting exemplars. Neither case, the
Third Circuit pointed out, concerned a nonconstitutional objection
to the grand jury enforcement of subpoenas. 34 Furthermore, in
both Mara and Dionisio the government had made a showing of
proper purpose. 3 5 Thus, the Schofield rule requires the govern-
ment to make a preliminary showing of relevance and need for all
matters subpoenaed by the grand jury before a district court will
enforce the subpoena. This preliminary showing is necessary be-
cause the party objecting to the subpoena (who has the burden of
showing some irregularity) 3 6 often finds it difficult to discover fac-
tual information regarding the enforceabililty of a subpoena be-
cause that information rests in the prosecutor's hands. Further-
more, grand jury proceedings are conducted in secret which
complicates the discovery procedure for the party opposing the
subpoena. 3 7 The Schofield requirements are still the rule in the
Third Circuit. 3 '
131. Id. at 93.
132. 410 U.S. 1 (1973)
133. 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
134. Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 89.
135. Id. at 94 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
136. In re: Grand Jury Matter (Stout), 770 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1985); In re
Matter of Grand Jury Applicants, 619 F.2d 1022, 1029 (3d Cir. 1980).
137. See supra note 118.
138. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 770 F.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir. 1985) and In
re Grand Jury Matter (Gronowicz), 764 F.2d 983, 986 (3d Cir. 1985). However, the
burden the government must shoulder is so minimal under Schofield, that it
nearly renders the showing illusory. The showing must be made by affidavit and
as modified in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d
Cir. 1975), does not "require a showing of reasonableness, . . [does not] require
any determination of probable cause and clearly [does] not require a hearing in
every case." This minimal showing is probably why one House of Representatives
Subcommittee found that the rule "has not caused any serious disruption of
grand jury proceedings" in the Third Circuit. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1589 (1977).
A majority of circuit courts have rejected the Schofield rule as unduly bur-
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In In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 39 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals took the Schofield rule and modified it to
fit the limited situation where the subpoenaed party is an attorney
who represents a grand jury target in an ongoing attorney-client
relationship. The subpoena in Harvey requested records from the
attorney of all money and property received on behalf of the client,
Harvey. In this situation, the court found that the "attorney-client
privilege considerations and sixth amendment interests arise auto-
matically and a preliminary showing must be made by the govern-
ment before the attorney can be forced to appear before the grand
jury. " 140 This preliminary showing must demonstrate "that the in-
formation sought is relevant to and needed for an investigation be-
ing conducted by the grand jury. '1 4' In reaching its holding, the
Fourth Circuit again pointed out that Dionisio and Mara were
based on constitutional challenges and that courts had the "power
to fashion rules to further the administration of justice when such
rules are necessary.' 42 Although Harvey was subsequently va-
cated, the en banc holding to vacate gave no other reason for the
decision other than the target's fugitive status.' 43 A later unpub-
lished opinion suggested that the decision to vacate raised a "seri-
ous question" about the correctness of the original opinion.14 4 Al-
though the decision in Harvey continues to be cited with favor 4,
and has been posited with a few modifications as the best alterna-
tive to prevent prosecutorial abuses of attorney subpoenas,16 the
dening the grand jury with preliminary showings. See In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, Walsh v. United States, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); In re Grand Jury Inves-
tigation (McLean), 565 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1977); Universal Manufacturing Co. v.
United States, 508 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977).
139. 676 F.2d 1005, vacated when target fled, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982)
(en banc) (also discussed at supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text).
140. Id. at 1010.
141. Id. at 1011 (emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 1012.
143. Harvey, 697 F.2d at 113.
144. United States v. Morchower, No. 83-1816 (4th Cir. Sept. 28, 1983).
145. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp.
958, 963 (D. Mass. 1985) and In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839, 851 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
146. Peirce & Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecu-
tion: Curbing the Practice of Issuing Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for
Targets of Investigations, 36 Hastings L.J. 821, 865 (1985) ("By imposing a need
requirement, the Harvey rule strikes the proper balance between preserving the
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decision to require a preliminary showing has been rejected in a
significant number of instances.",
7
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center)," s8 a
district court quashed a subpoena that requested a legal service
clinic to turn over all records relating to the clinic's representation
of Nigerian nationals in pending proceedings before the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service. The court quashed the subpoenas
on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and, adopting the rea-
soning of Harvey, required that "the government demonstrate, as a
preliminary matter, that the information sought by the subpoenas
is necessary to the grand jury investigation and that there is no
other reasonably available source for that information other than
the attorneys' files."'"94 The reason for such a showing was that the
subpoenas would have a "significant chilling effect on the ability of
attorneys . . . to represent their clients zealously within the
bounds of the law."' 150
The supervisory approach, however, is not without its defects.
The Schofield rule is unnecessarily broad and is not tailored to the
special circumstances surrounding the attorney-client relationship.
In addition, its minimal requirements of relevance and proper pur-
pose do not provide the protection the relationship deserves. The
Harvey rule, while more narrowly adapted to the attorney-client
relationship and with its "need" showing when a target's attorney
is subpoenaed, fails to state exactly what requirements are neces-
sary to demonstrate this need.' 5 ' Furthermore, the Harvey opinion
ability of the grand jury to investigate effectively and protecting the attorney-
client relationship.").
147. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 84-1-24 (Battle), 748 F.2d 327 (6th Cir.
1984); In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1983).
148. 615 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1985)
149. 615 F. Supp. at 964. After quashing the subpoenas under the attorney-
client privilege, the district court also indicated it would have reached the same
decision on nonprivileged grounds because the subpoenas were "unreasonable and
oppressive in the context of the ongoing representation of a client before the
INS" and could properly be quashed under FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). Id. at 970. The
court reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that deportation proceedings are
not criminal proceedings.
150. Id. at 970.
151. The Fourth Circuit did state that the prosecution should address two
questions in seeking to demonstrate need: "First, is the information sought neces-
sary or important to the grand jury investigation? Second, is the subpoenaed at-
torney the best source for the information? A showing that the information can-
not be obtained from another source would, of course, be important to, but not
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is ambiguous on whether the preliminary showing must occur
before issuance of the subpoena or whether the showing is neces-
sary only for enforcement of the subpoena."5 2 Finally, critics have
attacked the supervisory approach under a separation of powers
argument because it allows judicial interference in an area of exec-
utive discretion. 153
D. The Justice Department Guidelines
In response to the growing concern over subpoenas to defense
attorneys representing grand jury targets, the Department of Jus-
tice instituted its own internal guidelines governing the issuance of
attorney subpoenas.1 5 ' The guidelines, which were added to the
United States Attorneys' Manual on July 18, 1985, and apply to
both grand jury and trial subpoenas, require that all "reasonable
attempts" be made "to voluntarily obtain information from an at-
torney before issuing a subpoena."1 55 The guidelines require the
approval of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Divi-
sion before issuing a subpoena.156 In order for the subpoena to is-
sue: (1) the information must be reasonably needed for the suc-
cessful completion of the investigation;1 57 (2) the government must
have made reasonable but unsuccessful attempts to obtain the in-
formation from other sources;158 (3) the government must have
made reasonable attempts to voluntarily obtain information from
the attorney;1 59 (4) the need for the information must outweigh the
risk that the attorney will be disqualified;160 (5) the information
necessarily conclusive for, the second inquiry." Harvey, 697 F.2d at 1011 n.6
152. Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 3, at 865.
153. Note, supra note 81, at 155. See also Beale, supra note 128, at 1516
("contrary to the suggestion in several lower court decisions, neither supervisory
power nor federal common law may be used to limit the constitutionally permissi-
ble exercise of prosecutorial discretion"). But see Krieger & Van Dusen, supra
note 5, at 739 (use of prosecutorial discretion to effect defense attorney's disquali-
fication through grand jury subpoenas and fee forfeiture amounts to a government
control of the right to counsel and therefore subject to judicial overview).
154. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.161(a) (1985). The guidelines
are set out in the appendix. For one evaluation of the guidelines, see Note, supra
note 81.
155. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.161(a)(B).
156. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(D).
157. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(F)(1).
158. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(B).
159. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(C).
160. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(F)(4).
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must not be covered by a valid privilege;1 " and (6) the subpoena
must be directed at material information regarding a limited sub-
ject matter.16
The guidelines are a significant attempt to bring attorney sub-
poenas under control. The provision requiring reasonable attempts
to first obtain the information from the attorney, however, may
create ethical problems. This results because DR 4-101 requires
preserving the confidentiality of "secrets."' 6 3 "Secrets" could, of
course, include unprivileged fee or client identity information. The
guidelines encourage the prosecutor to negotiate with the defense
attorney and the negotiations may include these "secrets. '164 The
rules do permit disclosure upon court order, 6 " but limit strictly
the information that can be disclosed without client consent."6' As
noted recently, the ethical rules
would seldom permit [voluntary disclosure] when an Assistant
United States Attorney requests information that may be used in
a criminal proceeding against a client. Any voluntary disclosure
must be done only with the full knowledge and consent of the
client. The lawyer, however, may have a conflict in advising the
client about whether to give this consent, since it would be in the
attorney's interest generally to provide the factual information re-
quested to avoid a grand jury subpoena.167
Furthermore, "personal considerations-such as a desire to avoid
becoming personally implicated in the criminal activity-may in-
duce the attorney to make inappropriate disclosures in order to
avoid a professionally damaging appearance before the grand
jury."168 This action may deprive the client of his sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel.1 69
161. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(F)(6).
162. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(F)(5).
163. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
164. Note, supra note 81, at 173 ("bothersome ethical questions may arise
from the very fact that negotiations take place at all") (citing ABA GRAND JURY
COMMITTEE, PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR CALLING OF LAWYERS AS GRAND JURY WIT-
NESSES 3 n.1 (1985)).
165. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1979).
166. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
167. Rudolf & Maher, supra note 3, at 19.
168. Note, supra note 81, at 173.
169. See Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1984) (conviction re-
versed where defense counsel responded to trial subpoena with a stipulation
which eliminated the need for his testimony but clearly incriminated his client).
See also Note, supra note 81, at 173 (suggesting that guidelines be revised so that
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Perhaps the most critical defect is the fact that the guidelines
are self-imposed and self-governing. The guidelines state that they
do not "create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at
law by any party, in any manner, civil or criminal, nor do they
place any limitations on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative
prerogatives of the Department of Justice. 1 7 The individuals de-
termining whether the guidelines have been satisfied are neither
neutral nor detached. Furthermore, recent statistics released by
the Department of Justice reveal that the guidelines have done lit-
tle to stem the flow of attorney subpoenas.1 7 1
V. THE ETHICAL RULE
In reaction to the increasing number of grand jury subpoenas
served on defense attorneys by prosecutors, the Massachusetts Bar
Association initiated a proposal for a new rule which made it an
ethical violation for a prosecutor to issue grand jury subpoenas to
defense attorneys without prior judicial approval, where the prose-
cutor sought to compel the defense attorney to provide informa-
tion about the attorney's client.17 2 The rule was later endorsed by
all negotiations take place in the client's presence).
170. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL at § 9-2.161(a)(F)(6). See also In re
Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 635 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendants should not rely on courts to
apply guidelines); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 236,
245 n.1 (2d. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986). See generally
United States v. Caputo, 633 F. Supp. 1479, 1489-90 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (noting that
although United States Attorney's Manual suggests defendants should receive
target warning, dismissal of indictment not warranted where defendants not
prejudiced by absence of warning). But see Note, supra note 81, at 167 (external
constraint of Justice Department desiring to avoid judicial imposition of more
restrictive measures and some courts' willingness to consider extent of compliance
with internal standards in prosecutorial misconduct allegations before the grand
jury should combine to produce effective compliance with the guidelines).
171. In the first seven months after enactment of the guidelines, 169 subpoe-
nas were issued, an average of better than one per day. Rudolf & Maher, A Sub-
poena a Day Keeps the Clients Away, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1986, at 5.
172. Riley, New Rule Set on Lawyer Subpoenas, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1985, at
3, 42. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp. 958 (D.
Mass. 1985) and another First Circuit case, In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F.
Supp. 107, aff'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984), both of which involved Boston attor-
neys, played a key role in getting bar support for PF 15. See Riley, NAT'L L.J. at
3, 42.
In In re Grand Jury Matters, the First Circuit affirmed a district court's
quashing of subpoenas issued to five attorneys. The United States Attorney in the
case candidly admitted in the motion opposing the quashing that the grand jury
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the Boston Bar Association," 3 and on October 1, 1985, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted the rule as Su-
preme Judicial Court Rule 3:08, Prosecution Function 15.174 The
rule provides:
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to subpoena an
attorney to a grand jury without prior judicial approval in cir-
cumstances where the prosecutor seeks to compel the attorney/
witness to provide evidence concerning a person who is repre-
sented by the attorney/witness.'
PF 15 became effective January 1, 1986, and immediately met
was conducting an investigation of federal drug and tax offenses committed by
the attorneys' clients. At the time the subpoenas were issued, the defendants had
already been indicted on state drug charges in New Hampshire. The New Hamp-
shire Bar Association, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Massa-
chusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Civil Liberties Union
of Massachusetts and New Hampshire all filed as intervenors in the action. The
district court found that
the actions of the U.S. Attorney are without doubt harassing, show min-
iscule perception of the untoward results not only to those who practice
criminal law, but those in the general practice of law .
To permit [the subpoenas] would have an arctic effect with the non-
salutary purpose of freezing criminal defense attorneys into inanimate
ice floes, bereft of the succor of constitutional safeguards.
In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. at 107.
In affirming the lower court's determination, the First Circuit said that it was
clear that the lower court "quashed the subpoenas because of the effect the tim-
ing of the subpoenas could have on the attorneys' ability to prepare and-present
their clients' defenses in the pending state criminal action." In re Grand Jury
Matters, 751 F.2d at 17. The court then held that the district court could prop-
erly quash the subpoenas without reference to a specific privilege in the exercise
of its Rule 17(c) supervisory powers because the subpoenas were "unreasonable
and oppressive." Id. at 18.
173. Id. at 3. The rule was also endorsed by an ABA resolution at its annual
midyear meeting in 1986. Falsgraf, A Dangerous Wedge Between Attorney and
Client, 72 A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 8.
174. United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986). The New
Hampshire Bar Association is currently considering a disciplinary rule identical to
the one adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Frank, Are
Federal Subpoenas Subject to State Rules?, 72 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 33. The
rule is also under consideration in Rhode Island, the District of Columbia and
Illinois. The Illinois proposal also calls for an amendment to the state's criminal
code to include the requirement of prior judicial approval. 2 Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 247 (July 9, 1986).
175. MAss. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08 (Prosecution Function 15) (1985) [hereinaf-
ter PF 15].
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with controversy. Defense attorneys hailed the rule as a much
needed remedy to the problem of attorney subpoenas, while prose-
cutors were doubtful of the rule's validity as applied to federal ac-
tions. 17" Federal prosecutors, aware that the rule could well impede
the investigative functions of their offices, filed suit contesting the
rule's application to them and seeking an injunction against its en-
forcement. 177 Because the decision in this case raises critical issues
concerning the propriety of using a state ethical rule to control
federal grand jury practice, the rule will first be considered in the
context of United States v. Klubock.1 "
A. PF 15 and the Klubock Decision
1. The District Court Decision
The United States District Court for Massachusetts first heard
the government's complaints in Klubock. Prosecutors charged that
PF 15 conflicted with the current federal practice of issuing grand
jury subpoenas. A preliminary issue facing the court, however, was
whether PF 15 was a rule of the district court, much less a valid
one. This issue arose because the district court did not have its
own specific rules of ethical conduct to govern the actions of attor-
neys practicing before it. Rather, a local court rule"" incorporated
176. Riley, supra note 172, at 3, 42.
177. United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, No.
86-1413 (1st Cir. Mar. 25, 1987) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp
file). The defendants in the action were members of the Board of Bar Overseers of
the Supreme Judicial Court and Bar Counsel for the Board, the persons charged
with enforcing the disciplinary rules issued by the Supreme Judicial Court. The
Massachusetts Bar Association, Boston Bar Association, and Massachusetts Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers were allowed to intervene as defendants.
178. Id.
179. The rule provided:
Acts or omissions by an attorney admitted to practice before this Court,
individually or in concert with any other person or persons, which violate
the Code of Professional Responsibility, either of the state in which the
attorney is acting at the time of the alleged misconduct or of the state in
which the attorney maintains his principal office shall constitute miscon-
duct and shall be grounds for discipline, whether or not the act or omis-
sion occurred in the course of an attorney-client relationship. The Code
of Professional Responsibility means that code adopted by the highest
court of the state, or commonwealth, as amended from time to time by
that court, except as otherwise provided by specific rule of this Court
after consideration of comments by representatives of bar associations
within the state or commonwealth.
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the disciplinary rules for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts into
the rules of the district court. Prosecutors argued that a rule as
far-reaching as PF 15 should not be automatically incorporated
into the local rules. Judge Zobel of the district court declined to
decide whether PF 15 was incorporated and instead held, that in
either case, the issue was whether the rule conflicted with federal
law.180
The prosecutors then argued that PF 15 was inconsistent with
the procedure of issuing subpoenas under Rule 17181 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This inconsistency was not allowed
by Rule 57 of those same rules,"8 2 if the rule was adopted by the
incorporation provision. If, however, the rule was not incorporated,
and existed solely as a state ethical rule, the prosecutors argued in
the alternative that the rule still conflicted with the supremacy
clause. 183 The prosecutors argued that the Federal Rules were "a
D. MASS. R. 5(d)(4)(B), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES 7-8 (Calla-
ghan 1982), amended July 1, 1986, 2 FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES 45-46 (Calla-
ghan 1986).
180. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 119. But see United States v. Kelly, 550 F.
Supp. 901 (D. Mass. 1982), where the district court followed a recommendation of
the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers that a federal prosecutor not be disci-
plined for violating the Supreme Judicial Court Rules of Massachusetts even
though the state rules were "the standard for professional conduct adopted in
Rule 5 [the incorporation rule] of the District Court." Id. at 903.
181. A subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the court.
It shall state the name of the court and the title, if any, of the proceed-
ing, and shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend and
give testimony at the time and place specified therein. The clerk shall
issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank to a party
requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is served. A subpoena
shall be issued by a United States magistrate in a proceeding before him,
but it need not be under the seal of the court.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
182. Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may
from time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportu-
nity to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not incon-
sistent with these rules . . . . In all cases not provided for by rule, the
district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they
act.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57.
183. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
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complete and comprehensive procedure governing grand jury sub-
poenas" which precluded district courts from infringing on the
rules' exclusive mandates. 18' The defendants countered that Rule
17 was "'little more than a housekeeping rule'" to guide the court
in the exercise of its supervisory power.'85 Judge Zobel found that
Rule 17 was merely mechanical and "was not tailored to the special
concerns raised when it is invoked by the uniquely powerful grand
jury. "186
Though Judge Zobel found that Rule 17 was merely mechani-
cal, the prosecutors attacked PF 15 because it differed from Rule
17(a)'s requirements that the clerk of the court issue subpoenas
that are signed, sealed and stamped but otherwise issued in
blank.'87 A prosecutor under PF 15 would now have to obtain prior
judicial approval before having a subpoena issue, a definite change
in the current practice under Rule 17(a). The court, however, read
PF 15 to require prior judicial approval only at some point before
service of the subpoena on the defense attorney, and not its issu-
ance from the clerk. Under this reading there would be no change
in actually obtaining the subpoena, only in serving it. Judge Zobel
found that a prosecutor obeying PF 15 could still get the subpoena
issued in blank from the clerk, fill it out as allowed under Rule
17(a), and then seek court approval without conflict with the cur-
rent procedure.' 88
The prosecutors then compared Criminal Rule 17(f), which re-
quires a court order before taking a deposition, 189 with the corre-
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST., art. IV, cl. 2.
184. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 121.
185. Id. at 121-22. The district court emphasized its supervisory powers over
the grand jury in the opinion. The court found these grants in 18 U.S.C. § 3331
(1982) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a) which give district courts the power to call grand
juries into existence. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1982) and FED. R. CRIM. P.
17(a) give district courts the power to issue and enforce grand jury subpoenas. As
well, the district court pointed out a court's duty to prevent the grand jury from
becoming an instrument of oppression. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 119-120 (citing
Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D.
Pa. 1976)).
186. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 122.
187. See supra text accompanying note 12.
188. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 120 n.8.
189. "An order to take a deposition authorizes the issuance by the clerk of
the court for the district in which the deposition is to be taken of subpoenas for
the persons named or described therein." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(f)(1).
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sponding Civil Rule 45(d) which is absent a similar requirement. 190
Criminal Rule 17(f) is the only subsection of Rule 17 to require
prior judicial approval before acting. The prosecutors argued the
omission of a prior approval requirement in the rest of Rule 17
signaled an intent to limit judicial involvement in the subpoena
process. The corresponding Civil Rule 45(d) had originally man-
dated court approval before a party could issue a subpoena to com-
pel production of documents at depositions. This requirement was
later deleted because it was "'unnecessary and oppressive on both
counsel and court, and it had been criticized by district
judges.'"191 The Klubock court rebutted this argument, noting
that the deposition was the norm in civil proceedings but was an
"exceptional circumstance" in criminal actions."9 2 Such a deletion
in a limited circumstance did not signal an intent to prevent judi-
cial involvement in the subpoena process, especially as it related to
grand jury subpoenas." '9
The prosecutors also argued that Rule 17(c) 194 was the only
means (besides a contempt proceeding) by which a party could
challenge the validity of a subpoena. The court pointed out that by
its terms, Rule 17(c) applied only to a subpoena duces tecum and
that the rule contained no provision for quashing a subpoena ad
testificandum, but courts had repeatedly quashed subpoenas com-
pelling testimony "when the interests of justice so warranted." 9 5
That courts could quash testimonial subpoenas without an express
statutory grant demonstrated that Rule 17(c) harbored no silent
prohibitions.'"
190. "Proof of service to take a deposition . . . constitutes a sufficient au-
thorization for the issuance by the clerk of the district court for the district in
which the deposition is to be taken of subpoenas for the persons named or de-
scribed therein." FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1).
191. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 122 (quoting FED. R. Cwv. P. 45(d) advisory
committee note (1946 amendment)).
192. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 123. "[T]he deletion merely reflected the fre-
quency with which depositions were taken, and the sufficiency of the motion to
quash remedy." Id.
193. Id.
194. "A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to
produce the books, papers, documents or other object designated therein. The
court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance
would be unreasonable or oppressive." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
195. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 123.
196. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the district court distinguished United
States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d
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The district court next stated the test of whether a conflict
existed between PF 15 and Rule 17: "A local rule is inconsistent
with federal rules and statutes if it alters those aspects of the liti-
gation process which bear upon the ultimate outcome of the litiga-
tion, thereby frustrating federal policies. ' 197 Applying this test to
the case at bar, the district court again emphasized that while the
grand jury holds broad powers of investigation, courts still had the
duty to prevent abuse of grand jury subpoenas. The crucial issues
were whether PF 15 deprived the grand jury of evidence previously
permitted under federal law, and whether PF 15 would burden the
grand jury with preliminary showings.198
The court answered in the negative to both issues. PF 15 pro-
vided neither new testimonial privileges nor did it create new
grounds to shield a citizen from testifying. In addition, the prior
judicial showing would create little change in grand jury proceed-
ings since federal prosecutors were already required by the Depart-
ment of Justice guidelines to demonstrate many of the things they
would be required to show in a prior hearing.199 The prior hearing
would operate, though, to exclude evidence which previously might
have gone before the grand jury-evidence which had it come to
the attention of the court, however, would have been properly sup-
pressed in the first instance."'0
As a final question, the court considered whether PF 15 vio-
lated the supremacy clause.20 Under the Supreme Court's ruling
in Sperry v. Florida,0 2 a state ethical rule which conflicts with fed-
eral law is invalid. The district court relied on its previous discus-
sion of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to find that there
was indeed no conflict. Additionally, PF 15 did not interfere with
704 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972); and Williams v. United
States District Court, 658 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981),
which the plaintiffs cited for support that silence in the federal rules has a preclu-
sive effect.
197. Id. at 124 (quoting Williams v. United States District Court, 658 F.2d
430 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981)).
198. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 124.
199. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
200. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 125.
201. See supra note 183.
202. 373 U.S. 379 (1963). In Sperry, a state ethical rule forbad the practice of
law by nonattorneys, including persons practicing before the United States Patent
Office. A federal statute as well as Patent Office regulations allowed nonattorneys
to practice before the agency. The Supreme Court struck down a court order
which had allowed the state rule to remain in effect.
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federal officers in the execution of their duties since regulation of
the legal profession, including federal prosecutors, was a proper ex-
ercise of state power.2"' Therefore PF 15 did not violate the
supremacy clause and was a valid local rule.
2. The Court of Appeals Decision
The government appealed the Klubock decision to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, which recently affirmed the district
court's decision.20 The First Circuit first found that the govern-
ment's arguments concerning the supremacy clause issue were ei-
ther moot or nonjusticiable. The court ruled the issue moot be-
cause in June 1986, after the lower court decision, the district
court specifically incorporated PF 15 into its local rules.20 5 By its
specific incorporation, PF 15 could no longer be considered state
law, but rather, had now become federal law. The prosecutors ar-
gued, however, that PF 15 created the possibility that a federal
prosecutor could be charged in a state disciplinary proceeding if
the prosecutor disobeyed PF 15 in a federal district other than
Massachusetts.2 0 6 The court rejected this contention, relying on as-
surances by the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, who indi-
203. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 126 (citing Sperry, 373 U.S. at 383 & n.2 and
United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 968 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
227 (1985)).
204. No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. Mar. 25, 1987) (available on LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, USApp file).
205. This action came about in response to the government's attempt to have
the district court except the Massachusetts' rules dealing with prosecution func-
tions out of the local district court rules. See Gertner, On Trial: A Disciplinary
Rule That Limits Attorney Subpoenas, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1986, at 6, 42. Local
Rule 5(d)(4)(B) now states:
Acts or omissions by an attorney admitted to practice before this
Court. . . that violate the ethical requirements and rules concerning the
practice of law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, shall constitute
misconduct and shall be grounds for discipline. . .. The ethical require-
ments and rules concerning the practice of law mean those canons and
rules adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, embod-
ied in Rules 3:05, 3:07 and 3:03 of said court.
D. MASS. R. 5(d)(4)(B), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL COURT LocAL RULES 45-46 (Calla-
ghan 1986).
206. For example, if District Attorney X, a member of the Massachusetts
bar, served a subpoena in Vermont, where he was a district attorney, and failed to
comply with PF 15, he could be charged in Massachusetts state court, since by its
terms PF 15 applies to any attorney admitted to practice before the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
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cated that the rule would not apply to any actions taken outside
Massachusetts and that any enforcement proceedings would be
brought in federal court in Massachusetts.07 The court concluded
that while such a policy remained in effect, there was no case or
controversy present and therefore no supremacy clause issue.2 0'
The opinion then shifted to the district court's rulemaking
power to adopt PF 15. Rather than focusing first on possible con-
flicts with the Federal Rules, the court's opinion shifted the em-
phasis to the "latent ethical issues" involved in serving a grand
jury subpoena on a defense attorney representing a target. Because
of these ethical issues, courts were charged with getting an "ethical
handle" on the situation as soon as possible.209 This power to con-
trol the issuance of subpoenas through an ethical rule came from
the courts' regulatory power over not only the "dealings of counsel
and the courts and of counsel and their clients, but equally impor-
tant, . . . counsel versus counsel in their adversarial roles. 2 10 Be-
cause the regulation of ethical relationships between courts, law-
yers and clients had been traditionally left to the courts, PF 15
properly placed the control in the district courts where the
problems arose. 1
The court then briefly looked to any potential conflicts PF 15
had with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Like the dis-
trict court, the First Circuit found no specific conflict with the
Federal Rules in requiring prior judicial approval, stating, "silence
in the Federal rules of procedure does not necessarily mean that
the courts are powerless to correct perceived problems as they
arise, either by decision, or by local rule, where appropriate." '
In a change in tack, the government argued that the court of
appeals should use its supervisory authority to proscribe the dis-
trict court's regulation of members of the bar. The First Circuit
found that if such supervisory authority did exist, review consisted
of abuse of discretion since the regulation of members of the bar
207. But see infra note 270.
208. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. Mar. 25, 1987) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, USApp file). "We, of course, cannot predict any changes in the
stated policy, or what would be the outcome of any legal situation created
thereby-we should not cross that proverbial bridge until required to do so by the
constitutional circumstances." Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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rested with each individual district court. 13 Echoing the district
court, the First Circuit found that PF 15 was closely worded and
"highly unobstrusive" because of the existing requirements in the
Department of Justice guidelines. Finally, the court pointed out
the growing seriousness of grand jury subpoenas to defense attor-
neys representing targets. All of these factors led to a conclusion
that PF 15 was a limited, reasonable response to a mounting prob-
lem rather than an abuse of discretion, and that district courts
were in a better position to judge the appropriate response to the
problem. " In answer to arguments that PF 15 would burden the
grand jury's investigative function, the court concluded its opinion
by stating that PF 15 was not aimed at grand jury action, but dealt
instead with prosecutorial conduct. If a grand jury issued a sub-
poena independently, PF 15 would not apply and therefore would
have no effect on the grand jury's function as an independent in-
vestigatory body. "
The dissent by Chief Judge Campbell questioned the use of
the district court's rulemaking authority to adopt a rule that pro-
duced so fundamental a change in issuing grand jury subpoenas. "
Judge Campbell argued that "local rules were never conceived to
be a means for changing policies properly regulated at the federal
level." 17 Furthermore, he found the service/issuance interpretation
of PF 15 "far too fine a distinction to provide a convincing ration-
ale"216 to resolve any inconsistency, and instead pointed out that a
"local rule may be inconsistent if it is discordant with the policies
implicit as well as explicit in the federal rules." 1" Judge Campbell
stated:
Were we writing on a clean slate, perhaps a different view would
be in order. But we are not writing on a clean slate; the Supreme
Court and other courts ... have made it clear that any prior ju-
213. The First Circuit found the district court's control over members of its
bar specifically vested by 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982) which states: "In all courts of
the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally
or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to man-
age and conduct causes therein."
214. Klubock, No. 86-1413.
215. Id.
216. "PF 15 operates in a policy area too sensitive, important and controver-
sial to be regulated at a local district court level." Id. (Campbell, C.J., dissenting).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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dicial screening of subpoenas impacts seriously and questionably
upon the protected information-gathering powers of the grand
jury.220
Instead of allowing the district court to adopt this controversial
alteration in issuing grand jury subpoenas, Judge Campbell found
that the proper forum for change was through Congress or the Su-
preme Court.22 1
B. The Rule Examined
In spite of two court opinions on the subject, some critical
questions about PF 15 remain unresolved. First, there still exists
the issue of whether a rule such as PF 15 can be incorporated into
the local rules for a district court by a catchall incorporation provi-
sion such as the one originally used by the District Court of Massa-
chusetts. Second, whether a district court may adopt by its
rulemaking power, a rule such as PF 15, which produces funda-
mental changes in issuing grand jury subpoenas, is subject to ques-
tion. Third, there still remain potential conflicts with federal law.
Finally, and most critically, because PF 15, as adopted, lacks any
stated standards concerning the prior judicial approval necessary,
it may have exacerbated the problem of grand jury subpoenas to
defense attorneys rather than providing a remedy for abuses.
1. Ethical Rules and the Incorporation Issue
One issue neither court resolved in Klubock was whether a
state ethical rule such as PF 15 can be incorporated into the local
rules for a federal district court by a broad local rule which incor-
porates all the disciplinary rules for a state into the district court's
local rules.222 A substantial number of districts have local incorpo-
ration rules similar to the one in force when PF 15 was originally
issued.223 These incorporation rules are approved by a majority of
220. Id.
221. Id. The First Circuit has recently agreed to rehear the Klubock case en
banc. Whether this signals disagreement with the majority opinion remains to be
seen. Moss, Attorney Fees Exempt, 73 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 35.
222. See supra note 179.
223. See, e.g., S.D. ALA. R. 1(A)(4), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL LOCAL COURT
RULES 53 (Callaghan 1984) ("Any attorney who is admitted to the bar of this
court or who appears in this court ... shall be deemed to be familiar with and
governed by ... the ethical limitations and requirements governing the behavior
of members of the Alabama State Bar . . . ."); E.D.N.C. R. 2.10, reprinted in 2
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judges in the district as required by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules.
Presumably, when these incorporation provisions were adopted,
the disciplinary rules for the particular state were fairly standard.
PF 15, however, is anything but the standard ethical rule.
While the regulation of the legal profession is a proper exercise of
state power, 224 and includes the authority to regulate the conduct
of federal prosecutors,225 a rule which changes the procedure of is-
suing federal grand jury subpoenas is outside the scope of ethical
codes. Ethical codes were intended to be used only as regulatory
rules governing lawyers, and not as procedural rules governing civil
and criminal cases.2 6 PF 15 is inconsistent with this particular
FEDERAL COURT LOCAL RULES 77 (Callaghan 1984) ("The ethical standard gov-
erning the practice of law in this court is the Code of Professional Responsibility
of the North Carolina State Bar, Incorporated now in force and as hereafter mod-
ified by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, except as may be otherwise pro-
vided by specific rule of this court."); D. OR. R. 110-2, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL
COURT LOCAL RULES 7 (Callaghan 1984) ("[A]ny attorney permitted to practice in
this court shall be familiar and comply with the standards of professional conduct
required of members of the Oregon State Bar . . .").
There exists no obligation for district courts to adopt or apply the Code of
Professional Conduct of any particular state or of the American Bar Association.
Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp.
1348, 1351 (D. Colo. 1976). See also Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir.
1964) ("[We do not think that the rule of Erie. . . compels the federal courts topermit, in proceedings before those courts, whatever action by an attorney-at-law
may be sanctioned by the courts of the state."); J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt,
523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[A] court need not treat the Canons of Pro-
fessional Responsibility as it would a statute that we have no right to amend.").
224. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 & n.2 (1963).
225. See United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 968 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 227 (1985).
226. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibilty?, 57
N.C.L. REV. 497, 514 (1979). However, because this is not stated specifically in
either the Model Code or the Model Rules, some courts have used disciplinary
rules as if they are procedural rules. Id. The Preamble to the Model Rules does
state that "the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by
opposing parties as procedural weapons." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Preamble (1983). See also Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 917, 576 P.2d 971, 978, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, 16 (Manuel, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Rules of Professional Conduct "are not rules of practice
promulgated by the Judicial Council to insure the integrity and efficiency of judi-
cial process"), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 568 (1978).
One of the examples of misuse Professor Sutton gives is that of using DR 5-
101(B) and DR 5-102 to disqualify opposing counsel:
That result was never intended; on the contrary, those disciplinary rules
were intended to protect a client from overreaching by his own lawyer
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purpose, since, in seeking to remedy the ethical problems, PF 15
changes the procedure involved in serving grand jury subpoenas,
even though attorney subpoenas do raise ethical issues of defense
attorney disqualification.
2. District Court Rulemaking
If followed, PF 15 alters the process of issuing subpoenas to
defense attorneys with its requirement of a prior judicial show-
ing-a showing which has been rejected by a significant majority of
courts facing the issue.2 Such a radical change, propounded by
state officials and grafted onto federal court procedure, should re-
quire discussion among federal district court judges and notice to
the public according to Rule 57 .2 s A state ethical rule which is
incorporated into the local rules by an incorporation provision
avoids this process. Although disciplinary rules may be regularly
added and amended, it hardly seems consonant that an ethical rule
which produces so fundamental a change in the procedure of serv-
ing grand jury subpoenas should be adopted with minimal involve-
ment by the federal courts, the public, and Congress. Once incor-
porated, the ethical rule must be regarded as wielding the same
force as the Federal Rules since local rules have the force and ef-
who might be willing to lessen his value to his client in order to obtain or
continue employment in litigation. . . . [The disqualification] issue
should be resolved only in a disciplinary proceeding brought when there
is reasonable cause for charging that the lawyer did not serve his client's
best interests by being both witness and advocate.
Sutton, 57 N.C. L. REV. at 515.
Nor does PF 15 avoid one of the major criticisms leveled at ethical
rules-that of uncertainty as to the bounds of the law. See Patterson, A Prelimi-
nary Rationalization of the Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C.L. REv. 519, 525 n.20
(1979). See infra notes 275-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
problems with the ethical rule's lack of standards. Dean Patterson notes: "To
treat ethical rules of conduct as legal rules denies [the lawyer] the choice the
former gives, and so constitutes a threat to his exercise of discretion and hence to
his independence and authority." Id. at 522.
227. See supra note 147.
228. See supra note 182. Rule 57 was amended in 1985 to correspond to FED.
R. Civ. P. 83 to emphasize that the procedures to promulgate local rules are the
same under either the civil or criminal rules. The major purpose of the restructur-
ing, however, was "to enhance the local rulemaking process by requiring appropri-
ate public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 advisory committee note, reprinted in 3A C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 92 (Supp. 1986).
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fect of law.'1 9 Even if PF 15 is the proper subject of an ethical rule,
because it was adopted in a district court with minimal legislative
involvement and because it significantly alters grand jury practice,
the rule as enforced may be an improper usurpation of the legisla-
tive function. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for exam-
ple, were established by an express Congressional delegation of au-
thority.2" This delegation "authorized the Supreme Court, not
Congress, to identify the relevant policies and to balance compet-
ing interests. 23 1 In the case of PF 15, the only grant of authority
to promulgate the rule came from the Rule 57 grant, a grant that
arguably does not encompass the power to issue a rule as far-
reaching as PF 15.232
Rule 57 was intended to end any requirement of conformity to
state procedure by federal courts. 233 The rule allows local federal
229. United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570 (1958). Because they do have the
force of law, "local rules should be held to be binding upon the parties and court
that promulgated them until they are changed by a majority of the judges of the
district." 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §
3153, at 224 (1973). Rule 57 provides that individual judges may regulate their
practice in "any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district
in which they act." The district court in Klubock used this clause to decide that
even if PF 15 were not incorporated, judges could "regulate their practice in order
to assist federal prosecutors to comply with the ethical rule. . .. Klubock, 639 F.
Supp. at 121 n.12. See also Beale, supra note 128, at 1457 ("The lower federal
courts have also employed their supervisory authority to control the conduct of
the prosecutor in order to enforce ethical and professional standards"); and 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1982) ("The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.
Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and
procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court"). Rule 57 also allows the judicial
council for the circuit to abrogate local rules if it desires.
230. 18 U.S.C § 3771 (1982). Under this section the Supreme Court is author-
ized to prescribe rules of "pleading, practice and procedure" but must submit
each proposed rule before Congress. Furthermore, the rule does not become effec-
tive until ninety days after the submission.
231. Beale, supra note 128, at 1505.
232. PF 15 "is not the sort of task for which individual district courts were
granted their limited rulemaking powers." United States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413
(1st Cir. March 23, 1987) (Campbell, C.J., dissenting) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, USApp file). If a district were to apply the rule because of a broad
catchall provision of the local rules (as the district court did initially) the ethical
rule would even avoid the normal Rule 57 procedure. Moreover, the separation of
powers doctrine limits judicial interference with prosecutorial functions pursued
by the executive branch. See Beale, supra note 128, at 1494.
233. "One of the purposes of this rule is to abrogate any existing requirement
of conformity to State procedure on any point whatsoever." FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b)
1987]
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courts to tailor their practices to specific local details of criminal
cases.2 34 Though the draftsmen of the Criminal Rules discouraged
the making of local rules,23 5 the effort has met with little success
and a large number of local rules have been adopted.2 38 Local rules,
however, are not subject to the pre-adoption scrutiny given the
Federal Rules and as a result, are often hastily adopted with a
minimum of study by scholars and practicing lawyers.2 37
Although Rule 57 requires that "copies of the local rules and
amendments are to be furnished to the judicial council and the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and also made
available to the public,' 2 3 one commentator has stated concerning
such requirements:
This reporting system provides no control at all. Filing does
not imply approval by the Supreme Court or by the Administra-
tive Office. . . . While there is an unofficial service collecting all
civil, general and admiralty rules, it does not include the local
advisory committee note to original rule (amended 1985), reprinted in 3A C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 581 (1982).
234. WRIGHT, supra note 233, § 902, at 374.
235. "There was no desire to suggest or encourage the multiplication of de-
tailed local rules. . .. [Liocal rules should be as few as absolutely necessary, and
that minutiae of practice should be left to judicial discretion in conformity with
the tradition of the powers of a Federal judge." Comment of Judge Alexander
Holtzoff in N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 123 (1946),
reprinted in WRIGHT, supra note 233, § 901, at 371.
236. This power, though hedged with limitations, has been the imprima-
tur for a plethora of individualized rules which have generally remained
unchallenged and untested by subjection to the comprehensive scrutiny
of judicial decision or scholarly inquiry. Indeed, one legal scholar has
characterized the fruits of the power as the "soft underbelly" of federal
procedure.
Note, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A Sur-
vey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1011-12. The need for more standardized local rules
within the same state has also been recognized. See Blair, The New Local Rules
For Federal Practice In Iowa, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 517, 519 (1974) (consolidation of
local rules for both district courts in Iowa). But see Flanders, In Praise of Local
Rules, 62 JUDICATURE 28 (1978).
237. This lack of a democratic system involving the bar and law schools
is a particular defect of local rule making. There often is no public no-
tice, no public hearings, and no way to oppose adoption. There is no real
opportunity even to challenge the rules in litigation since the judges who
will decide the case are often the ones who adopted the rules.
Weinstein, Reform of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 63 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1977,
at 47.
238. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57.
[Vol. 9:347,
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rules which affect criminal matters. . . . [Aln attack on a local
rule on the ground that a copy was not sent to the Supreme Court
or to the Administrative Office would seem to have little chance
of success. As a result of these deficiencies, lack of familiarity
with local rules may become a trap for unwary lawyers from other
districts.13
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (No. 83-M-25-R),240 a dis-
trict court considered a request to promulgate a local rule under
Rule 57, restricting the right of attorneys to contact and interview
grand jury witnesses during an ongoing tax fraud investigation.
The government alleged that the practice by a law firm amounted
to a systematic "debriefing" of witnesses appearing before the
grand jury and that this conduct produced a chilling effect on the
witnesses' willingness to testify fully.241 The court declined to issue
the rule, finding that it would be more substantive than procedural
even though several other districts had enacted a similar rule.24 2
Rulemaking was a departure from the courts' traditional role and
was legislatively delegated from Congress because of courts' exper-
tise in litigation.24 8 Because it was a deviation from traditional
court practice and therefore raised separation of powers issues,
"[c]ourts ought not to adopt rules relating to important matters
requiring deliberation and factfinding.' 4 4 This was even more the
case when local rules were issued without the safeguards inherent
239. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM.
L. Rav. 905 (1976). See also Blair, supra note 236, at 519 (requirement that copies
of local rules be provided to Supreme Court does not imply an absolute power of
review). The Supreme Court does, of course, have the limited power of review to
determine if local rules are consistent with the Federal Rules. Nevertheless, some
courts have held that the failure of the Supreme Court to object to a local rule
signals implicit approval of the rule so as to preclude review by an appellate
court. See Cooley v. Strickland Transp. Co., 459 F.2d 779, 785 (5th Cir. 1972).
The function of filing the rules, however, is essentially a housekeeping measure.
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 229, § 3153, at 226.
240. 558 F. Supp. 532 (W.D. Va. 1983).
241. Id. at 535.
242. See also Blair, supra note 236, at 518 (local rule-making is limited to
matters of practice and procedure which may not effect or create any substantive
right).
243. The rulemaking power found in Rule 57, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and other
provisions of law, represents a departure from the basic rule that federal courts
only decide cases and controversies and do not render advisory opinions. In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 558 F. Supp. at 535.
244. Id. at 536.
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in legislative rulemaking. 2 "
The nadir of local court rulemaking was reached in Gamble v.
Pope & Talbot, Inc.,2 46 where the Third Circuit rejected a local
rule which provided for fines to attorneys who delayed court pro-
ceedings. The district court fined an offending attorney under the
local rule and the attorney appealed. In reversing the district
court, the Third Circuit found that such a fine was in effect a con-
tempt action. There was no indication that the district court in-
voked either of the federal statutes which granted contempt pow-
ers,2 47 and since the conduct of the attorney did not fall within the
purview of either statute, the Third Circuit found "the local rule
making power, while not limited to the trivial, cannot extend to
basic disciplinary innovations requiring a uniform approach. ' 248
A more liberal approach to local rulemaking is exemplified in
In re Sutters" where the Second Circuit upheld a $1500 fine
against an attorney for violating a local rule that forbad the ob-
struction of the "'effective administration of the court's busi-
ness.' " 50 Local bar associations submitted an amicus brief arguing
that the standards under the local rule should be the same as those
provided in the federal contempt rule of 18 U.S.C. section 401.251
The Second Circuit rejected the argument, pointing out that such
a holding would make the local rule superfluous and, relying on the
grant of authority from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83252 that
authorized district courts to promulgate local rules, upheld the lo-
cal rule's validity. Such a rule was necessary to reduce court con-
gestion and further, as the court stated,
[w]hether grounded upon the inherent power of the court or upon
the rule-making power conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 2071, the opera-
245. The court found that adopting a rule such as the one requested would
require "fundamental policy decisions of a kind not amenable to consideration by
this court." Id.
246. 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1962).
247. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 and 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
248. Gamble, 307 F.2d at 732. Gamble was subsequently overruled in Eash v.
Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) where the Third Circuit found
the Gamble court's reasoning ran counter to the Supreme Court's observations
that contempt sanctions were significantly different from a court's broad power to
discipline attorneys as officers of the court and that the result in Gamble was
"excessively restrictive in practice." Id. at 565-66.
249. 543 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1976).
250. Id. at 1034.
251. Id. at 1035.
252. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 is identical to FED. R. CRIM. P. 57.
392 [Vol. 9:347
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tive principle is the same: if the local rule is related to the man-
agement of the court's business and it is not inconsistent with a
statute or other rule or the Constitution, then it is valid.253
A test such as the one stated in In re Sutter, that validates a
local rule which is "related to management" is obviously broadly
based. Were PF 15 simply related to management of the court's
business, it might qualify as a proper exercise of rulemaking power.
However, PF 15 is not restricted to merely "court management"
but changes the entire procedure for issuing grand jury subpoenas
to defense attorneys. As detailed in the next section, in changing
this procedure it shifts the burden between the parties in demon-
strating the propriety of grand jury subpoenas. Because of this
shift, PF 15 is inconsistent with federal law and is therefore an
improper exercise of district courts' rulemaking power under Rule
57.
3. Inconsistency With Federal Practice
A critical factor upon which the test for inconsistency hinges is
the extent of the preclusiveness of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In United States v. Ferretti,24 the Third Circuit faced
a challenge to a local rule which provided that if the defense pro-
duced no evidence to rebut a charge, the prosecution should make
its closing argument first and the defense should then make its fi-
nal argument following the prosecution. Federal Rule 29.1 pro-
vided that the prosecution should argue first, followed by the de-
fense and then the prosecution would be allowed to rebut. In
holding the two rules compatible, the court stated, "Rule 29.1 only
provides the norm for the general situation. It does not deal with
the specific circumstance of a defendant who presents no evidence.
Thus we do not read the provisions of [Local] Rule 13(a) as being
inconsistent or incompatible with Rule 29.1.11255
Taking this general/specific test and applying it to the issu-
ance of subpoenas, Rule 17 deals with the general situation in
253. Sutter, 543 F.2d at 1037. The local rule as well must be consistent with
the policies contained within the federal rules. See Rodgers v. United States Steel
Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1975) (local rule restricting contact among putative
class action representatives in Rule 23 action was inconsistent with the policies
under Rule 23 of having common interests of fact and law disposed of in a single
lawsuit).
254. 543 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1976).
255. Id. at 1092-93.
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which a prosecutor calls an ordinary person to testify. As the
Klubock district court pointed out, Rule 17 does not differentiate
between subpoenas issued for trial and subpoenas issued for a
grand jury.2 56 Rule 17 does not speak to the limited situation of a
subpoena that is served on an attorney in an ongoing attorney-cli-
ent relationship who is requested to testify or produce documents
for the grand jury.157 PF 15, however, does provide a procedure for
dealing with this special circumstance. Yet PF 15 still has case his-
tory which militates against its procedure in the grand jury arena.
The Supreme Court on two occasions has spoken to the
rulemaking powers of the lower courts. In Miner v. Atlass,5 s the
Court faced a local admiralty rule159 that allowed the district court
to order oral depositions for the purpose of discovery only. The
district court was given the power to promulgate local admiralty
rules by a General Admiralty Rule2 similar to Rule 57. In spite of
the absence of a direct conflict with any General Admiralty Rule,
the Court found the local rule inconsistent with the history and
policies behind the Federal Rules.261 The Court stated:
[T]he matter is one which, though concededly "procedural," may
be of as great importance to litigants as many a "substantive"
doctrine .
[B]asic procedural innovations [should] be introduced only after
mature consideration of informed opinion from all relevant
quarters with all the opportunities for comprehensive and inte-
grated treatment which such consideration affords. . . . [W]e...
256. "The rule simply was not tailored to the special concerns raised when it
is invoked by the uniquely powerful grand jury." Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 122.
The district court also pointed out that Rule 17(c) applied only to subpoenas du-
ces tecum and contained no provision for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum.
Id. at 123 (citing 2A WRIGHT, supra note 233, § 273, at 149).
257. The Federal Rules may also be read expansively in the Rule 17 area. Cf.
8 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.06 (2d ed. 1986) (By the language of
Rule 17(c), the procedure to quash only applies to a subpoena duces tecum but in
an appropriate case, the motion to quash a subpoena ad testificandum may be
entertained).
258. 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
259. N.D. ILL. ADM. R. 32.
260. GEN. ADM. R. 44 provided: "In suits in admiralty in all cases not pro-
vided for by these rules or by statute, the District Courts are to regulate their
practice in such a manner as they deem most expedient for the due administra-
tion of justice, provided the same are not inconsistent with these rules."
261. Miner, 363 U.S. at 649-50 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 9:347
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hesitate to [permit] a change so basic as this to be effectuated
through the local rule-making power, especially when that course
was never reported to Congress .... "'
In Colgrove v. Battin,2 s however, the Supreme Court upheld a
local rule264 providing for six-person juries in civil trials in the face
of a challenge that the rule conflicted with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 48265 which allows juries of less than twelve only by stip-
ulation of the parties. While recognizing the holding in Miner that
"basic procedural innovations" were beyond local rulemaking
power, the Court noted there was no "'discernible difference be-
tween the results reached by the different-sized juries' ",266 and
therefore concluded, in allowing the rule to stand, that it produced
no significant change in the ultimate outcome of the litigation.2 67
Rules like PF 15, however, could produce significant changes
in the outcome of a case, especially if the grand jury is unable to
obtain information from alternate sources to issue an indictment.
While this information may have been protected in any instance,
and the prior hearing requirement is important in protecting the
262. Miner makes clear that "literal conflict is not the sole ground for incon-
sistency under" FED. R. CRIM. P. 57. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, USApp file) (Campbell, C.J., dissenting).
263. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
264. D. MONT. R. 13(d)(1) provides: "A jury for the trial of civil cases shall
consist of six persons plus such alternate jurors as may be impaneled."
265. FED. R. Civ. P. 48 states: "The parties may stipulate that the jury shall
consist of any number less than twelve or that a verdict or a finding of a stated
majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury."
266. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 163-64 n.23 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 101 (1970)). See also United States v. Richter, 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973)
("the rules ... do not purport to set outer limits of the power of the court").
267. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 163-64. The majority in Klubock pointed out that
it was "difficult to imagine changes more 'fundamental' in nature" than altering
the number of jurors on federal juries and if such a rule passed muster in Col-
grove, it "fail[ed] to see any reason why the ethical concerns espoused by PF 15
should be invalidated." Klubock, No. 86-1413 (available on LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, USApp file). Chief Judge Campbell, in his dissent, distinguished Colgrove,
pointing out that there was a tradition of local control over jury arrangements and
furthermore, there was no history of questioning the innovation as was the case
with the procedure enacted by PF 15. Id. (Campbell, C.J., dissenting).
The decision in Colegrove has been criticized as a radical change in federal
jury composition brought about by local rulemaking. "The matter was certainly
worthy of a more effective debate than it was accorded when it was attacked as a
fait accompli in litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court .... " Wein-
stein, supra note 239, at 954.
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attorney-client relationship, the fact that the change is brought
about by a state ethical rule which was subsequently adopted by a
federal court, produces a conflict with the Federal Rules. As noted
earlier, the Federal Rules do not require a prior hearing before the
issuance of a subpoena. The procedure under Rule 17(a) is to ob-
tain the subpoena issued in blank from the clerk of court and then
serve it on the subpoenaed party. Most courts have rejected a simi-
lar requirement of a preliminary showing in the exercise of their
supervisory powers.2"' Moreover, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Dionisio69 ruled against burdening the grand jury with
minitrials. Aggravating the conflict is the fact that PF 15 originates
from a state ethical rule and may be an improper attempt to en-
graft state procedure onto federal practice. 7 0
268. See supra note 147.
269. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
270. The First Circuit in Klubock relied on assurances by the Massachusetts
Board of Bar Overseers that any enforcement proceedings dealing with violations
of PF 15 would be brought in federal court in Massachusetts, rather than before
state authorities. Because no proceedings had been instituted in the state forum,
the First Circuit found no case. or controversy concerning this aspect of the
supremacy clause issue. A few months prior to the First Circuit's affirmance in
Klubock, however, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 86-738 (D. Mass. Nov. 26,
1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), the district court faced a
motion to quash a subpoena on the basis that the Assistant United States Attor-
ney had failed to obtain prior judicial approval before subpoenaing an attorney
requesting him to produce evidence about a former client. The court declined to
quash the subpoena on the basis of the prosecutor's noncompliance with PF 15,
but then turned to the issue of whether the prosecutor had committed an ethical
violation. The court stated: "It is quite clear . . . that the Overseers believe that
the Assistant United States Attorney has acted improperly in the premises and no
doubt they believe that I ought [to] refer him to them or to some other appropri-
ate 'counsel' for such investigation and disciplinary action as may be appropri-
ate." Id. The court found no violation of PF 15, holding that the rule simply did
not apply where the attorney did not currently represent his former clients, but
pointed out that the Overseers believed differently. Therefore, "it is open to them
to initiate disciplinary proceedings for whatever they believe are the violations of
the Massachusetts Code of Professional Responsibility as promulgated by the Su-
preme Judicial Court." Id. Any attempt by state authorities to apply the ethical
rule to former clients, however, would have triggered a supremacy clause issue,
since there then would have existed a direct conflict between the interpretation
urged by the state authorities and that held by the federal court. It therefore
remains unclear exactly what the role of state authorities is in the enforcement of
PF 15.
The court also pointed out in No. 86-738 that "the position taken by the
Overseers cannot help but have an effect on the conduct of the Massachusetts
Attorney General, the Massachusetts District Attorneys, and their assistants, thus
50
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Furthermore, PF 15 shifts the burden of proof in challenging a
grand jury subpoena. Prior to PF 15, a subpoena was presumed
regular, 7 ' and a subpoenaed attorney had to demonstrate that
compliance with the subpoena was "unreasonable or oppressive,"
or that the attorney-client privilege, work product rule, Constitu-
tion or statute protected the information. With the adoption of a
rule like PF 15, however, the burden has shifted to the prosecutor
to make a preliminary showing that the subpoena is proper-that
is, the presumption has changed so that the subpoena to the de-
fense attorney is presumed invalid until the government makes a
preliminary showing.27 2 This change in the presumptive validity of
a subpoena which shifts the burden to the government is arguably
substantive as well as procedural.2 73 This shift in demonstrating
the invalidity of a subpoena not only conflicts with current prac-
tice under Rule 17 but exceeds district courts' rulemaking
authority.2 7
4
introducing an unfortunate dichotomy in the ethical obligations of those attorneys
from that of their federal counterparts." Id. The case demonstrates the need for a
uniform procedural rule, rather than an ethical rule that attempts to masquerade
as one.
271. See, e.g., United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (VanArtsdalen), 632
F.2d 1033, 1041 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Morgan, 377 F. Supp. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). In addition, Rule 17 "must be given [its] ordinary meaning to carry out the
purpose of establishing a more liberal policy for the production, inspection and
use of materials at the trial." Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214
(1951).
272. See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1013
(4th Cir.) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), vacated when target fled, 697 F.2d 112
(1982).
See also Caplow, The Reluctant Witness for the Prosecution: Grand Jury
Subpoenas to Defense Counsel, 51 BROOKLYN L. REV. 769, 801 (1985), where the
author suggests a preliminary burden of production on the prosecutor during the
motion to quash hearing.
273. See Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Fed-
eral Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 537, 549 (1984) ("If ... a local rule reverses a fundamental pre-
sumption in the federal rules, it should be open to a successful challenge"); cf.
Note, Estate of Younger: Violation of an Ethical Consideration Equals a Legal
Presumption, 45 U. PiTT. L. REv. 719, 731 (1984) ("[R]ules of conduct, regardless
of their form, are not allowed to change the substantive rights of litigants . ...
[T]he creation of a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of production
from the challenger of a will can be said to abridge the substantive rights of the
proponent.").
274. [Ilt legislates in an area far beyond Congress's and the Supreme
1987] 397
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4. The Lack of Standards
Perhaps the most critical defect of PF 15 is that it provides no
standards 7 to guide judges or parties in the required prior judicial
showing before the grand jury subpoena can be served on the de-
fense attorney. The Klubock decisions left unstated the standards
to apply in the showing, which subjects PF 15 to the same criti-
cisms of vagueness as the Harvey rule.2 78 Requiring a mere state-
ment of justification in an affidavit by the prosecutor makes the
showing meaningless, yet requiring a full adversarial hearing would
seem to violate the Supreme Court's prohibition against saddling
grand juries with minitrials under United States v. Dionisio.2 " In
addition, an adversarial hearing would potentially violate the veil
of secrecy surrounding the grand jury as required by Criminal Rule
6(e)2 78 by allowing counsel for the subpoenaed party to discover
what kind of information a prosecutor had against his client at a
very early stage of the proceedings. The lack of any standards
could also lead to disparate results depending upon the federal dis-
Court's limited delegation of rulemaking authority to local tribunals. PF
15 is not simply some minor procedural or "ethical" variation. It marks a
dramatic and controversial departure from the historically limited power
of the courts to supervise the grand jury, interposing a step that, in very
similar contexts, both the Supreme Court and circuit courts have, so far,
disallowed.
Klubock, No. 86-1413 (Campbell, C.J., dissenting).
275. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 124. In spite of approving of PF 15's adoption,
the First Circuit has not adopted a need and relevancy test. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, No. 86-738 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file) (citing In re Grand Jury (Hill), 786 F.2d 3, 5 n.2 (1st Cir. 1986)).
In addition to the lack of standards with which to apply in reviewing attorney
subpoenas, unless the kinds of subpoenas to which the ethical rule applies are
carefully set out, the grand jury may be unduly burdened:
To blur the limits of [PF 15's] applicability [which] could well serve to
cause cautious prosecutors to submit to a reviewing judge beforehand
every subpoena to be served upon an attorney, a requirement ... which
invites preliminary skirmishing over matters which may have nothing
whatsoever to do with the substance of an appropriate grand jury
investigation.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 86-738 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1986) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
276. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
277. 410 U.S. 1 (1973). But see the discussion supra at notes 133-35 and ac-
companying text of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d
Cir. 1975).
278. See supra note 118.
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trict adopting the rule. For example, one federal district might
merely require a showing by affidavit of justification for the infor-
mation from the prosecutor. Another district, however, might re-
quire a full adversarial hearing in order to hear from the subpoe-
naed defense attorney. The result is that in one district the
subpoenas would be issued almost as a matter of right, while in the
other district a preliminary hearing would occur on just the issue
of whether the information was required by the prosecutor. In an
area as sensitive as subpoenaing attorneys, a uniform rule is
needed, rather than one that allows for diffuse and diverse
standards."7 9
Moreover, in the PF 15 scenario, where the court has already
subjected the subpoena to some judicial review, the defense attor-
ney's challenge in the later Rule 17(c) motion to quash hearing
may be limited. This could be especially true where the same judge
who rules in the PF 15 hearing also rules on the 17(c) motion.'"
Compounding this problem is that, to date, the prior judicial re-
view has consisted of only an ex parte hearing, the contents of
which have been denied to the defense attorney seeking to quash
the subpoena in the later Rule 17(c) hearing.28 Potentially, this
creates a more dangerous situation than that prior to the PF 15
showing requirement because the prosecutor has an opportunity to
argue ex parte for the issuance of the subpoena in the PF 15 hear-
ing, and then again before the very same judge who allowed the
subpoena's issuance in the first instance.2 82 Although not specifi-
279. In fact, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were established to
provide such a uniform procedure. However, since the grand jury is still subject to
courts' supervisory powers, some courts might add other criteria as they deem
necessary, a practice which certainly does not promote uniformity. Caplow, supra
note 272, at 801.
280. This is exactly what has happened in the case of PF 15. See Gertner,
supra note 205, at 43.
281. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Attorney), No. 86-665 (D.
Mass. Sep. 9, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), where the
court refused an in-house counsel's request to examine the submission made by a
prosecutor to support the prosecutor's request for permission to subpoena the in-
house counsel. The prosecutor in the case was merely required to show that the
subject matter would not offend the attorney-client privilege or "constitute an
unwarranted intrusion into the relationship between the lawyer and his client-
employer." Id. The court found that the attorney should first appear before the
grand jury and then it could be determined more exactly whether the requested
information would infringe on the privilege.
282. Gertner, supra note 205, at 44.
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cally resolved in the PF 15 area, there probably exists no right of
appeal from the prior judicial hearing.8 3
PF 15 does hold one advantage over the other alternatives in
that the remedy for violation of the ethical rule is professional dis-
cipline of the prosecutor.284 This allows the grand jury to proceed
relatively unimpaired, 85 while at the same time punishing the of-
fending party. Any holding, however, that would grant new
grounds for quashing subpoenas or created new testimonial privi-
leges would clearly conflict with Rule 17 and current federal law in
the area of grand jury procedure. 86
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
All of the approaches discussed as remedies to the attorney
subpoena problem have their defects. The common characteristic
of all (with the exception of the Department of Justice guidelines),
is their failure to adequately define exactly what is protected and
what kind of prior showing is required. The grand jury's important
investigative function must be given substantial weight in arriving
at any alternative. A rule that requires the government to demon-
strate need and that the attorney is the only source of the informa-
tion could, in the words of the Doe court, stop the grand jury
"'dead in its tracks.' -1287 Yet, as prosecutors become more aggres-
sive, the grand jury subpoena becomes fraught with greater un-
checked potential for abuse. A procedure which adopts those show-
ings already made under the Department of Justice guidelines
would hardly work an excessive burden on the prosecutor.
Rather than attempting to attack the problem through ethical
rules, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended
to accommodate the narrow circumstance of a subpoenaed attor-
ney who represents a grand jury target. Such a rule should be
promulgated by Congress or the Supreme Court, which is given
283. Appeal might be gained if the district judge certified the matter under
28 U.S.C § 1292 (1982), but more likely, the defense attorney would have to diso-
bey the subpoena, be held in contempt, and then appeal from the contempt pro-
ceeding if the subpoena was not quashed under Rule 17(c).
284. But see supra note 270. Where state and federal interpretations of PF
15 conflict, the prosecutor may also be uncertain about what activities are covered
under the rule.
285. See Note, supra note 81, at 157.
286. See Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 124.
287. 781 F.2d at 248 (citing In the Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir.
1985)).
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Congressional delegation to promulgate the Federal Rules.288 The
new rule would thereby avoid those objections that judicially-
fashioned rules have met: that requiring prior judicial showings in
the grand jury arena is outside the scope of courts' supervisory
power. The rule would allow the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure to remain internally consistent, while at the same time al-
lowing the Court or Congress to resolve the conflict with the Dion-
isio holding against minitrials.
The new rule should require a prior ex parte hear-
ing-something more than a mere statement of justification by the
government, but something less than full-blown adversarial hear-
ing which could significantly burden the grand jury process. A
more exact framework for the showing necessary is already present
in the Department of Justice guidelines. The rule should, however,
omit the guidelines' requirement of negotiation with the defense
attorney, thereby avoiding any potential conflict of interest of the
defense attorney; or, alternatively, the new rule could require any
negotiations to take place only in the presence of the client." 9 As
noted above, it would hardly constitute a burden on the grand jury
or prosecutor by requiring the same information currently submit-
ted to the Assistant United States Attorney General for the Crimi-
288. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982). Professor David Roberts once noted that
one of the keys in deciding whether a rule is better enacted locally or nationally is
whether the cause of the problem is local or national in scope. Roberts, supra
note 273, at 553-554. Given Professor Genego's statistics about attorney subpoe-
nas, (discussed supra at notes 37-42 and accompanying text); the fact that most
circuits have faced the preliminary showing requirements concerning grand jury
subpoenas; and that several states are considering rules similar to PF 15, it is
apparent that the problem is national in scope and therefore more appropriately
addressed through the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Regarding which branch should enact the new rule, Judge Weinstein has pos-
ited that the issue is whether the rule establishes a basic policy formulation or
whether the rule deals with mere detail. In this vein, Judge Weinstein suggests
three guidelines for determining whether a matter is properly the subject of court
rulemaking rather than Congressional review. First, "only where new amendments
depart sharply from already approved policies does congressional scrutiny seem
desirable." Second, Congress should scrutinize those "rules and amendments that
may have a substantive effect more carefully than those that will probably have a
technical or procedural effect." Finally, "while many rules have substantive effect,
some such rules seem more fitting for review than others." In particular, Judge
Weinstein cites the area of privileges in the Federal Rules of Evidence as one
which warrants Congressional review. Weinstein, supra note 239, at 929-30 &
n.167 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
289. See Note, supra note 81, at 173.
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nal Division and presenting it instead to a judge. In addition, the
rule should be carefully drafted so that it is clear in exactly what
circumstances the rule would apply.29
The hearing would allow the court to balance the interests
present: The grand jury's right to every man's evidence, versus the
attorney-client interests at stake. Such a balancing process would
prevent a prosecutor from arbitrarily issuing subpoenas to attor-
neys representing grand jury targets in order to disqualify them,
yet would not unduly slow the grand jury's investigation. The
court should also consider whether the subpoena would require the
defense attorney to actually appear before the grand jury to assert
any privileges.2 9' The court could require less intrusive measures of
obtaining the sought-after information, such as allowing compli-
ance by affidavit which might help avoid the conflict in the attor-
ney over whether to testify, or disobey the subpoena and face the
contempt powers of the court.292 The process would also allow the
client to see exactly what information was requested and avoid the
image of his attorney sitting behind closed doors testifying against
him. Finally, if the subpoenas were allowed, the prior hearing
should in no way effect a motion to quash under Rule 17(c).
VII. CONCLUSION
The adversarial model of advocacy is fundamental to our sys-
tem of justice. Because grand jury subpoenas to defense attorneys
potentially infringe on this model, a change is needed in the prac-
tice of how they are issued. Simply providing a blanket privilege
for attorneys to avoid grand jury subpoenas would result in poten-
tially valuable information being denied the grand jury, and would
encourage hiding behind the cloak of the privilege. As pointed out
by the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes,293 it is undesirable
to exclude an entire class of persons from every citizen's obligation
to provide evidence when requested by the grand jury. But with
increasing numbers of subpoenas being served on defense attor-
290. See supra notes 275-86 and accompanying text. "[A] formless rule
would properly be considered little more than a special privilege accorded lawyers
and no others. Such a result is manifestly improper." In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
No. 86-738 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file).
291. Under PF 15, the defense attorney is still required to appear before the
grand jury and take the stand to assert the attorney-client privilege. See id.
292. See Caplow, supra note 272, at 801.
293. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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neys, some procedure is necessary to prevent infringement of the
attorney-client relationship.
PF 15 is a defective solution to this need for three reasons: it
conflicts with current federal law, its adoption exceeds district
courts' rulemaking authority, and it lacks specific standards of ap-
plication. Allowing state rules of ethics to engraft themselves upon
the federal courts is normally innocuous, but when the rules
change basic procedures of federal grand jury practice, one of the
primary reasons for the Federal Rules is defeated. Concerning local
rules, one commentator has noted:
[A]lthough the web woven [by the federal rules] may not be quite
seamless, its parts are strongly interdependent, and poorly drawn
local rules merely aggravate this problem. Conversely, even the
best-formulated local rules cannot solve the problem since by na-
ture their effect is purely local. Worse, they can mask the gravity
of the problems and divert attention from the need to address
them nationally.2"
To avoid potential conflicts between state and federal law as well
as to protect the attorney-client relationship, an amendment to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is needed-an amendment
which will help resolve the defense attorney's ethical/legal tug of
war.
Paul Marshall Yoder
294. Roberts, supra note 273, at 551-52.
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Appendix
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES FOR GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
ISSUED TO DEFENSE ATTORNEYS UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL (SECTION 9-2.161(A) (1985))
Because of the potential effects upon an attorney-client rela-
tionship that may result from the issuance of a subpoena to an
attorney for information relating to the representation of a client,
it is important that the Department exercise close control over the
issuance of such subpoenas. Therefore, the following guidelines
shall be adhered to by all members of the Department in any mat-
ter involving a grand jury or trial subpoena.
A. In determining whether to issue a subpoena in any matter
to an attorney for information relating to the representation of a
client, the approach must be to strike the proper balance between
the public's interest in the fair administration of justice and effec-
tive law enforcement and individual's right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel.
B. All reasonable attempts shall be made to obtain informa-
tion from alternative sources before issuing a subpoena to an attor-
ney for information relating to the representation of a client, un-
less such efforts would compromise a criminal investigation or
prosecution or would impair the ability to obtain such information
from an attorney if such attempts prove unsuccessful.
C. All reasonable attempts shall be made to voluntarily ob-
tain information from an attorney before issuing a subpoena to an
attorney for information relating to the representation of a client,
unless such efforts would compromise a criminal investigation or
prosecution or would impair the ability to subpoena such informa-
tion from the attorney if such attempts prove unsuccessful.
D. No subpoena may be issued in any matter to an attorney
for information relating to the representation of a client without
the express authorization of the Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division.
F.[sic] In approving the issuance of a subpoena in any matter
to an attorney for information relating to the representation of a
client, the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division
shall apply the following principles:
(1) In a criminal investigation or prosecution, there must be
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been or is being
committed and that the information sought is reasonably needed
for the successful completion of the investigation or prosecution.
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The subpoena must not be used to obtain peripheral or speculative
information;
(2) In a civil case, there must be reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the information sought is reasonably necessary to the
successful completion of the litigation;
(3) All reasonable attempts to obtain the information from
alternative sources shall have proved to be unsuccessful;
(4) The reasonable need for the information must outweigh
the potential adverse effects upon the attorney-client relationship.
In particular, the need for the information must outweigh the risk
that the attorney will be disqualified from representation of the
client as a result of having to testify against the client;
(5) Subpoenas shall be narrowly drawn and directed at mate-
rial information regarding a limited subject matter and shall cover
a reasonably limited period of time; and
(6) The information sought shall not be protected by a valid
claim of privilege.
These guidelines on the issuance of grand jury or trial subpoe-
nas to attorneys for information relating to the representation of
clients are set forth solely for the purpose of internal Department
of Justice guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not
be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, en-
forceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor
do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful investigative or
litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
1987]
59
Yoder: Grand Jury Subpoenas to Defense Attorneys Representing Targets: A
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1987
